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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT
SENTENCING
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK*
Abstract: The legal standards for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel at sentencing are underdeveloped. In other contexts, defen-
dants seeking to prove ineffective assistance must demonstrate that coun-
sel's performance fell below appropriate professional standards and that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient perform-
ance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The doc-
trinal uncertainty whether that standard applies to sentencing proceed-
ings in non-capital cases, coupled with worries that ineffective assistance
at sentencing claims will result in a flood of litigation, has led some courts
to require defendants to satisfy stricter prejudice standards in discretion-
ary non-capital sentencing regimes. This Article analyzes the ineffective
assistance jurisprudence and concludes that the sufficiency of counsel's
performance is largely evaluated against a backdrop of relevant substan-
tive law. The substantive law of non-capital sentencing is not well-
developed, which may explain the underdeveloped state of ineffective as-
sistance at sentencing standards. Drawing on several recent ineffective as-
sistance cases in the death penalty context, this Article identifies legal
principles and practices that may assist in making the legal assessments
necessary to analyze ineffective assistance at sentencing claims. These
principles and practices may provide a sufficient legal framework to ren-
der unnecessary the crude manipulation of the prejudice showing that
some courts have employed.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel includes a right to counsel at sentencing) As the Court has
* Associate Professor of LIM, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State
University. J.D., Yale Law School. BA, Columbia University. 1 want to thank Kelli Alces,
Laura Appleman, Bob Bartels, John Blume, Adam Chodorow, Aaron Fellmeth, Andy Hes-
sick, Jeff Kirchmeier, Erik Luna, Jeff Murphy, Zig Popko, Eve Brensike Primus, Mary Sigler.
Carrie Sperling, Sonja Starr, Judy Stinson, and Doug Sylvester for their helpful comments
on this project. Thanks also to Jennison Cox and Beth DiFelice for their research assis-
tance.
1 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967); see Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
203 (2001).
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explained in other contexts, the right to effective assistance of counsel is
an undisputed feature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 2 De-
spite the fact that substantial advocacy occurs during the sentencing
process, the standards for what constitutes ineffective assistance of coun-
sel during a non-capital sentencing proceeding are underdeveloped. 3
Courts have developed a substantial body of law regarding ineffec-
tive assistance in the context of the guilt phase of a criminal trial and in
the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial, even though such cases
constitute a very small percentage of all criminal cases. 4 The vast major-
ity of criminal defendants plead guilty rather than stand tria1, 5 and capi-
tal cases comprise a tiny fraction of all felony convictions. 6 The only
time that many defendants have an opportunity to observe their attor-
neys advocate for their interests is at sentencing, 7 and thus one might
2 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (recognizing that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel"). In the seminal right to counsel
case of Powell u Alabama in 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court described "the failure of the trial
court to make an effective appointment of counsel." 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (emphasis
added). The defendants in Powell were represented by counsel who was reportedly an al-
coholic and who declared himself to be unprepared and unfamiliar with Alabama law.
Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts "Legal Lynchings," in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1, 3-4 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). This attorney was as-
sisted by an elderly local attorney and was permitted less than half an hour to consult with
the defendants before trial began. Id. The Powell Court held that this representation did
not satisfy the Sixth Amendment because the duty to assign counsel "is not discharged by
an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." 287 U.S. at 71.
s Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court's "Culture of
Death," 34 Onto N.U. L. REV. 861, 879-81 (2008) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court
has failed "to give sufficient attention to non-capital" sentencing issues).
4 See id. (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court "devotes extraordinarly too much of
its scarce time and energy to reviewing death penalty cases and adjudicating the claims of
death row defendants").
6 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. Rev. 1117, 1155 n.195
(2008) ("In 2002, the plea rate nationally was 95% for all state court felony convictions ....");
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548, 2568 (2004) (explaining that in 2000 there was a "federal guilty plea rate of 95%"
and "[lin some federal districts, the rate exceeded] 99%"); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Hmtv. L. REV. 2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (reporting
similar rates); John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of
Criminaljury Trial, 15 HARv. J.L. & Pun. Pot.'Y 119, 121 n.6 (1992) (same).
6 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sen-
tencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2009); Berman, supra
note 3, at 876-77.
7 Of course, attorneys also serve as advocates during the plea negotiation of non-
capital cases, but that advocacy may be less visible to defendants as it does not occur in a
courtroom, and thus defendants may not be present when counsel is advocating for their
interests. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OE PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 36-46 (1978) (noting that plea bargaining usually hap-
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expect that ineffective assistance at sentencing claims are quite com-
mon. In practice, however, there are few published opinions review-
ing—and thus little legal guidance regarding—the adequacy of coun-
sel's performance at a non-capital sentencing proceeding. 8
One explanation for the judicial focus on trial and capital sentenc-
ing performance is that the stakes are higher: at trial counsel's per-
formance may result in the conviction of an innocent defendant, 9 and
counsel's poor performance during the penalty phase may be subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny because we perceive that "death is dif-
ferent" than non-capital punishment.
But there is an alternative explanation for the underdeveloped law
of effective assistance at non-capital sentencing: the effectiveness of
counsel's performance is largely evaluated with reference to the gov-
erning substantive law, and the substantive law of non-capital sentenc-
ing is woefully underdeveloped.° Historically, sentencing systems were
either fully determinate (i.e., any defendant who commits crime A was
sentenced to B years imprisonment) or indeterminate (i.e., the sen-'
tenting authority could select any sentence from within a broad
range)." Neither of these systems is particularly conducive to the de-
velopment of sentencing doctrine or principles. Compounding the
pens in conference rooms, courtroom hallways, or on private telephone calls rather than
in open court).
Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Human Punishment to Con-
stitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. awls. L. REV. 111, 152 (2007) (contending that non-capital
sentencing "surely demand[sl much more than the virtual blank check issued by the Su-
preme Court to the legislatures").
g Notably, courts will reverse for ineffective assistance when counsel's deficient per-
formance resulted in the conviction of an apparently guilty defendant—for example, if
counsel erroneously failed to suppress illegal, but nonetheless trustworthy and incriminat-
ing evidence against the defendant. Seefohn C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stunts, Ineffective
Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. Ctn. L. REV. 679, 686-87
(1990) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Whiteside in 1986 supports
a reading of the right to effective assistance of counsel as aiming "to promote reliable out-
comes," but that the Court's ruling in Idmmelman v. Morrison later that term undercuts that
reading).
10 "Substantive law" is generally understood as those legal rules that create, define, and
regulate the rights, duties, and powers of parties. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (8th
ed. 2004). Procedural law, in contrast, prescribes the steps for having a right or duty judi-
cially enforced. See id. at 1241. Of course, whether a particular question involves substan-
tive or procedural law can be the subject of considerable dispute. See generally Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For the purposes of this Article, however, substantive
sentencing law includes the statutory sentencing ranges for particular offenses, as well as
any statute, regulation, or common law indicating what factors to consider in selecting a
particular sentence from within the available statutory range.
11 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. Rev. 89,
131 (2006).
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problem is the historical unavailability of appeals from sentencing deci-
sions. Not only did the absence of appellate review stunt the develop-
ment of legal rules, it also resulted in fewer explanations by trial judges
of the reasons for their decisions. The lack of explanation at sentencing
contributed to dissatisfaction with indeterminate sentencing, as sen-
tencing decisions were viewed as little more than the idiosyncratic pref-
erences of individual judges.I 2
In recent decades, some jurisdictions have enacted sentencing
statutes or regulations that limit to varying degrees the discretion a sen-
tencing judge has in imposing a particular sentence. 13
 But in discre-
tionary sentencing systems—that is, those that do not limit sentencing
discretion through statutes or regulations—a robust standard for effec-
tive assistance of counsel at sentencing is impossible in the absence of a
shared understanding of the substantive reasons why particular sen-
tences are imposed.
This Article seeks to articulate a legal framework for ineffective
assistance claims in discretionary non-capital sentencing systems. Part I
describes the two-prong ineffective assistance standard that the U.S.
Supreme Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington. A defendant who
wishes to prove that she received ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate (a) that her attorney's performance was unreasonable
tinder prevailing professional norms, and (b) that counsel's deficient
performance resulted in prejudice. It then recounts how the Court ap-
plied the Strickland standard to mandatory non-capital sentencing in
United States v. Glover.
Part II evaluates the different approaches that courts have taken in
assessing prejudice in discretionary non-capital sentencing. In particu-
lar, it examines the heightened standards for prejudice that lower courts
have imposed. This Part contends that courts should adopt the preju-
dice standard ordinarily employed for ineffective assistance claims—Le.,
a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different—
because discretionary non-capital sentencing systems do not present
wholly unique questions of prejudice.
Part II explains that the courts that haVe adopted heightened
prejudice standards appear to have done so as a gate-keeping mecha-
nism. They have expressed concern about the ease with which a defen-
12 See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew liessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions,
60 ALA, L. REV. 1,4-5 (2008).
"s As explained in more detail below, the complexity of these limitations on sentencing
discretion, as well as the mandatory nature of the statutes or regulations, vary from system
to system. See infra note 95.
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dant could satisfy the ineffective assistance standard by demonstrating
that the sentence imposed might have been marginally shorter. This
Part argues that these courts have failed to appreciate that the costs as-
sociated with a remand for new sentencing—when compared to the
costs of a new trial or a new capital sentencing hearing—are limited,
and that because most ineffective assistance claims are raised on collat-
eral attack, only those defendants who are serving sentences in excess
of several years will have an opportunity to raise such a claim. Thus,
gate-keeping concerns may not be as salient as they first appear.
Part III notes that, although discretionary non-capital sentencing
systems do not warrant heightened prejudice standards, the application
of Strickland' performance inquiry in this context is likely to differ
from capital and mandatory systems. Deficient performance will be
more difficult for defendants to prove in discretionary non-capital sen-
tencing regimes than in capital or mandatory sentencing regimes. The
most successful sentencing ineffective assistance claims—claims of legal
error and claims of failure to investigate—often turn on legal consid-
erations.
Part ill describes how these legal questions pose unique difficulties
in discretionary non-capital sentencing systems because the law in these
discretionary systems is less developed than in other sentencing con-
texts. Some non-mandatory systems, such as advisory guideline systems
offer limited substantive law against which to measure counsel's per-
formance. But many systems do not provide such guidance. Ultimately,
this Part seeks to identify legal principles and practices in the discre-
tionary non-capital context in order to assist counsel and judges in
making the legal assessments necessary to analyze many ineffective as-
sistance claims. Further development of such principles and best prac-
tices may also serve to improve the quality of representation at sentenc-
ing by educating counsel about successful sentencing practices and
serving as a deterrent against poor representation at sentencing.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COURT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Strickland Standard
A defendant who wishes to prove that she received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel must satisfy two requirements: first, the defendant
must demonstrate that counsel's performance was unreasonable under
prevailing professional norms, and she must demonstrate that counsel's
1074	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 50:1069
deficient performance resulted in prejudice." This test was adopted by
the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.I 5 The Strickland test is
notoriously difficult for defendants to meet, 16 and the number of suc-
cessful ineffective assistance claims is quite low. 17 This is attributable to
the fact that courts will generally presume that counsel's performance
was adequate, and that the few defendants who are able to overcome
this presumption must still satisfy the prejudice standard. 18
14 See 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (*But does [Strickland's] after-the-fact, case-
by-case evaluation work? The evidence is not encouraging. Courts rarely reverse convic-
tions for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the defendant's lawyer was asleep, drunk,
unprepared, or unknowledgeable. In short, any `lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effec-
tive.'" (quoting Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999))); John H.,
Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, It's Like Deja vu All over Again": Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v.
Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 39 Am. J. CRIM. L. 127, 134 (2007) ("The standard the Court adopted
proved virtually impossible for defendants to meet, and instead of raising the bar for effec-
tive counsel, the Court created a bar to nearly all assertions of attorney inadequacy.");
William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and
Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRP& L. REv. 181, 181 (1984) (noting the significant
burdens that the Strickland opinion has placed upon defendants who challenge the ade-
quacy of counsel"); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1999) ("[T]he Strickland Court interpreted the requirements
of the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel in such an ultimately
meaningless manner as to require little more than a warm body with a law degree standing
next to the defendant."); Thomas J. Marlowe, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel or "How Can I
Satisfy the Sixth Amendment and Still Not Help My Client," 3 CAP. DEF. Dtc., Nov. 1990, at 29,
29 ("[The Strickland test] by its nature places a substantial burden on the defendant. This
burden is especially onerous due to the independent nature of each prong of the test.");
Charles M. Sevilla, Investigating and Preparing, an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim, 37
MERCER L. REV. 927, 927 (1986) ("[T] he ineffective assistance of counsel claim, con-
trary to popular mythology, is rarely successful."); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread
the Needle: Towards a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 427 (1988) ("Strickland's basic flaw is that ... it creates an almost
insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance."); Elizabeth Gable
& Tyler Green, Note, Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied
Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 764 (2004) ("[A] Strickland
challenge is exceptionally hard to win.").
17 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 16, at 1471 (citing Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 237, 259-60
(1995)); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 683-84 (2007) (noting that "the num-
ber of criminal convictions that courts reverse due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel
is strikingly low when compared to the frequency of ineffective assistance in practice"). But
see Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at 155-57 (documenting an increase in successful
ineffective assistance claims in the U.S. courts of appeals since the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Williams).
18 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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With respect to the performance prong, Strickland stressed that
"[j] udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferen-
tial, . [A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional stan-
dards ...."19 The Strickland Court referred to American Bar Association
("ABA") Standards for Criminal Justice as "guides to determining what
is reasonable,"2° but also admonished courts that a "particular set of
detailed rules" for counsel's performance would be inappropriate.21
The Court's more recent decisions have been increasingly hospitable to
the use of ABA Standards as benchmarks for assessing attorney per-
formance. 22 Some lower courts have interpreted the Court's more re-
cent decisions as a signal that the ABA Standards are an important and
widely accepted tool for evaluating defense counsel's performance. 23
But not all lower courts have followed this approach. 24
Commentators and judges alike have bemoaned the prevalence of
poor counsel performance, especially the performance of counsel ap-
pointed for indigent defendants. 25 But Strickland' s statement "that
counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
IS Id,
2G Id. at 688.
2I
21 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at
151 (describing Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla as "The Return of the Guidelines Ap-
proach"); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Celebrating Great Lawyming, 4 OHIO Sr. J. CRIM. L.
223, 224-25 (2006) (noting a shift in Justice O'Connor's attitude towards the ABA Stan-
dards from Strickland to Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla).
" See, e.g., Hamblin v Mitchell, 359 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2003) ("fT] he Wiggins case
now stands for the proposition that the ABA standards for counsel in death penalty cases
provide the guiding rules and standards to be used in defining the 'prevailing professional
norms' in ineffective assistance cases. This principle adds clarity, detail and content to the
more generalized and indefinite 20-year-old language of Strickland . . . ."); see also, e.g.,
Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at 157-59 (describing cases).
24 See Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at 159-62 (describing cases).
2' See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259, 1264 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973); Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 CoLust. L. REV. 9, 61 (1986); Genego, supra note 16, at 198-
99; Klein, supra note 16, at 1452; Calhoun, supra note 16, at 431-32 (collecting studies). See
generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer; 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). As Eve Brensike Primus notes, there are
instances of "personal ineffectiveness," which are attributable to individual defense attor-
neys, as well as ''structural ineffectiveness," which are attributable to the underfunding of
public defense and heavy defender caseloads. Primus, supra note 17, at 686-88.
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judgment"26 has been interpreted by some courts as essentially a shield
for counsel's behavior against judicial scrutiny. Seemingly egregious
examples of substandard representation—including counsel's conces-
sion of her client's guilt, 27 counsel's decision to remain essentially silent
at trial rather than conducting any real defense, 28 counsel's failure to
make any closing argument, 29 counsel sleeping during the trial," coun-
sel referring to client by a racial slur," counsel representing the defen-
dant while drunk, 32 counsel hinting that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment for the defendant in closing arguments," and counsel
representing the defendant while under the influence of drugs" or
mentally ill33—have been labeled effective assistance by some courts."
26 466 U.S. at 690.
27 See Marlowe, supra note 16, at 35 (describing cases). But see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 449 & n.111 (1996) (collecting cases
where '!courts have found per se ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel admitted
their clients' guilt").
28 SeeJo Ellen Silberstein, Note, Silence as a Trial Strategy After Strickland and Cronic: In-
effective Assistance of Counsel?, 3 TOUR° L. Rev. 263, 275-77 (1987) (describing Warner v.
Ford, 752 F.2d 622, 623-24 (11th Cir. 1985), in which counsel essentially relied on counsel
for co-defendants to challenge prosecutions case even though co-defendants' strategy was
to blame his client); id. at 278-79 (describing United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 253
(2d Cir. 1986), in which counsel's participation at trial was limited to an objection to trial
in absentia, objection to jury instructions, and moving for judgment of acquittal). But see
United States v. Cronic, 966 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) ("Ulf counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.").
29 See Marlowe, supra note 16, at 31 (describing Sawyer v. Butler, 848 F.2d 582, 592 (5th
Cir. 1988), and Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875-77 (5th Cir. 1989)). But see Sevilla,
supra note 16, at 935 n.48 (citing Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985, 987 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
•	 3° See Bright, supra note 25, at 1893 n.53 (describing cases); Kirchmeier, supra note 27,
at 426-27 (describing case from Texas); Klein, supra note 16, at 1447-48 (describing cases
from Texas and New York). But see Sevilla, supra note 16, at 935 (describing Javor v. United
States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984)). •
31 See Bright, supra note 25, at 1843 n.51 (describing cases finding no ineffective assis-
tance subsequently overturned on appeal).
32 See id. at 1843 n.54; Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 426; Klein, supra note 16, at 1448
(describing People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 441 (Cal. 1989) (en banc)).
33 See Bright, supra note 25, at 1860 (describing Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1096
n.2 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting)).
34 See Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 426; Gable & Green, supra note 16, at 769 (describ-
ing Smith v. list, 826 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1987)).
35 See Gable & Green, supra note 16, at 769 (describing Smith, 826 F.2d at 876).
36 Although many of these attorneys were ultimately deemed to have rendered ineffec-
tive assistance, they nonetheless garnered at least one judicial decision declaring their
actions not deficient.
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In short, courts generally presume that defense counsel's per-
formance was sound,37
 and they will often refuse to second-guess coun,
sel's decisions on the theory that "under the circumstances, the chal-
lenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."'" There are,
however, two categories of ineffective assistance claims in which the
Court has been more active in evaluating counsel's decisions." One
category is where counsel's decision was based on a misunderstanding
or ignorance of the law. 4° The seminal case is Kimmelman v. Morrison.'"
Counsel in that case failed to file a suppression motion because he was
unaware of the state's search and the evidence it had discovered. 42
Counsel's lack of awareness was due to the fact that he had failed to
conduct pre-trial discovery. 43 As the Court explained:
Counsel's failure to request discovery ... was not based on
"strategy," but on counsel's mistaken beliefs that the State was
obliged to take the initiative and turn over all of its inculpa-
tory evidence to the defense and that the victim's preferences
would determine whether the State proceeded to trial after an
indictment had been returned."
The Court held that counsel's performance was inadequate, noting
that the justifications counsel offered for his failure to file a suppression
motion "betray a startling ignorance of the law—or a weak attempt to
shift blame for inadequate preparation."43
The second category of ineffective assistance claim where the
Court has aggressively reviewed counsel performance is when counsel
37 'Counsel's competence ... is presumed." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
384 (1986).
" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
For criticism of the courts' seemingly unabated deference to strategic decisions or trial
tactics, see Bazdon, supra note 25, at 37-38; Berger, supra note 25, at 71; Marlowe, supra
note 16, at 36.
" It appears that the Court is also more active in evaluating claims of ineffective assis-
tance in capital than in non-capital cases. But that is a distinction based on type of case,
rather than type of ineffective assistance claim.
40 But see Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at 148 (stating that the Court found no
ineffective assistance in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185 (1986), despite evidence
that trial counsel misunderstood relevant law).
41 See 477 U.S. 365 (1985).
42
 Id. at 368-69.
43
 Id. at 369.
44
 Id. at 385.
45 Id.
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has failed to conduct an adequate investigation. 46 Wiggins v. Smith is an
example of inadequate investigation in a capital case. 47 In Wiggins, trial
counsel elected to focus its mitigation case on a theory that the defen-
dant did not kill the victim himself, and thus was not eligible for the
death penalty under state law. 48 Counsel did not conduct an adequate
investigation into the defendant's personal history, which would have
revealed that the defendant had suffered "severe sexual and physical
abuse" as a child. 49 The presentence report included references to a
distressing childhood, but counsel failed to conduct any further inves-
tigation into the defendant's personal history, despite the fact that it
was "standard practice" at the time to commission a social history re-
port and that there were funds available for that purpose. 5° Although
" See Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at 148, 158-59 (noting a "transition in the
rigor of the Court's review of claims that trial counsel conducted an inadequate investiga-
tion" and describing cases where courts held counsels' investigations to be inadequate);
Joel Jay Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1086-88 (1973)
(describing pre-Strickland cases); Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1656-61 (2008) (describing a modern trend toward heightened
scrutiny of mitigation investigations); Marlowe, supra note 16, at 31 (noting "the principle
that defense counsel must perform reasonable investigations" to discover possible mitigating
evidence); Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and
the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77, 94 (2007) (noting that the
Court's recent decisions in Williams, Wiggins, and Rampilla have resulted in lower courts
conducting "detailed analysis of trial counsel's preparation and investigation, especially in
death penalty cases"); id. at 104 ("It is clear that the United States Supreme Court has
tightened counsel's duty to investigate ...."). But see Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at
147-51 (describing inadequate investigations excused in the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier
cases).
47 539 U.S. 510, 527-28 (2003).
48 Id. at 515.
49 Id. at 516. According to a report prepared for post-conviction relief:
[P]etitioner's mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his sib-
lings home alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips
and garbage. Mrs. Wiggins' abusive behavior included beating the children
for breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked. She had sex with
men while her children slept in the same bed and, on one occasion, forced
petitioner's hand against a hot stove burner—an incident that led to peti-
tioner's hospitalization. At the age of six, the State placed Wiggins in foster
care. Petitioner's first and second foster mothers abused him physically ...
and ... the father in his second foster home repeatedly molested and raped
him. At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home and began living on
the streets. He returned intermittently to additional foster homes, including
one in which the foster mother's sons allegedly gang-raped him on more than
one occasion. After leaving the foster care system, Wiggins entered a Job
Corps program and was allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor.
Id. at 516-17 (internal citations omitted).
50 Id. at 523-24.
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courts ordinarily defer to a strategic decision by counsel not to present
every conceivable mitigation defense, the Court held that, given the
limited information contained in the presentence report, it was unrea-
sonable for counsel to end the investigation into the defendant's per-
sonal history because it rendered "a fully informed decision with re-
spect to sentencing strategy impossible." 51
The rare defendant who is able to demonstrate that counsel's per-
formance was deficient will not prevail on an ineffective assistance
claim unless she can also demonstrate prejudice. 52 The Strickland Court
adopted the following standard for prejudice: "The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's un-
professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent."53
 According to the Court, "[a] reasonable probability is a prob-
ability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 54 The
Court said that a reasonable probability is more stringent than a stan-
dard where the defendant would "show that the errors had some con-
ceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding," and less stringent
than a "more likely than not" standard."
Like the performance prong, the prejudice prong has also been
the subject of criticism, most of which claims that the prong is too diffi-
cult to satisfy. 56
 Stephanos Bilbas, for example, has suggested that psy-
chological biases—specifically the perception of inevitability—may
make the prejudice prong a difficult hurdle for defendants because
these biases make it hard for judges to imagine that cases could have
come out differently. 57
 Eve Brensike Primus has observed that ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims often are based on what the trial attor-
ney failed to do; proving prejudice in those cases raises "serious practi-
cal problems" because of "the delay in presenting the claim," during
which time evidence and witnesses for the defendant may have deterio-
rated or disappeared. 58 Others have criticized the prejudice standard
51 Id. at 527-28.
52 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
53 Id. at 694.
54 Id,
55 Id. at 693.
56
 Perhaps in response to the criticism of the prejudice prong, the State of Hawaii has
rejected the prejudice prong as a "requirement almost impossible to surmount.* See
Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 976 n.11 (Haw. 1993).
57 See Bibas, supra note 16.
55
 Primus, supra note 17, at 695; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, I., dissenting)
(expressing a similar concern); Adam M. Gershowitz, Get in the Game or Get Out of the Way:
Fixing the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 53 (2008) (same).
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because all defendants are entitled to effective representation, even .if it
would not alter the outcome of trial59 ; otherwise, the right to effective
assistance will be vindicated only for the innocent."
B. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing
The Supreme Court has not yet decided what standard applies to
ineffective assistance at sentencing claims in discretionary non-capital
sentencing systems. Although Strickland involved the effectiveness of
counsel during the sentencing phase of a capital case, the Court
framed its opinion as governing counsel's performance at trial and ex-
pressed reservations about whether a different standard might govern
in non-capital sentencing. 61 The Court reasoned that unlike In an or-
dinary sentencing, which may involve informal proceedings and stan-
dardless discretion in the sentencer, and hence may require a different
approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance,"
counsel's role during capital sentencing "is comparable to counsel's
role at trial."62 The Strickland Court may have originally thought that
non-capital sentencing required a different standard of performance
because of the traditional understanding in the early twentieth century
that "[s]entencing ... is wholly.the judge's province," 63 and thus coun-
sel's role is not that of a traditional advocate. Today, however, sentenc-
ing has become a proceeding in which defense counsel and prosecu-
tion advocate for particular sentences." It is therefore unsurprising
that "[m]ore trial rights apply at sentencing than many have sup-
posed"63 and that most lower federal courts apply the same two-prong
59 Blume & Neumann, supra note 16, at 13B-39, 164 (describing and endorsing the ar-
gument of Judge Bazelon in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting)).
6° Klein, supra note 16, at 1468.
61 See 466 U.S. at 686-87.
62 Id.
63 Richard H. Kuh, For a Meaningful Right to Counsel on Sentencing, 57 A.B.A. J. 1096,
1096 (1971).
64 See Sanford E1. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert—Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 807 (1961) (noting that the Supreme Court ''has on several
occasions recognized the 'invaluable aid' a lawyer can render at [the sentencing] stage in
calling the court's attention to mitigating circumstances which might result in a lighter
penalty").
63 Alan C. Michaels, Thai Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (2003).
Michaels argues that the Supreme Court's "sentencing rights decisions" can be explained
as "consistent with a conception of sentencing as constitutionally mandating a balanced
and thorough effort to determine the 'right' sentence, within the range of prescribed
penalties." Id. at 1775-76.
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standard to non-capital sentencing. 66
 The U.S. Supreme Court ulti-
mately did the same in Glover v. United States 6 7
Glover addressed the question of what the proper prejudice stan-
dard ought to be in mandatory non-capital sentencing systems.° The
circuits had split on whether a non-capital defendant merely had to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient perform-
ance led to any increase in her sentence, 69 or whether she had to dem-
onstrate that, but for counsel's deficient performance, her "non-capital
sentence would have been significantly less harsh."70
 At Glover's sentenc-
ing his counsel failed to contest in a meaningful way the government's
claim that various offenses should not be grouped together under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines section 3D1.2. 7 ' Having decided that Glover's
offenses should not be grouped, the district court determined that the
appropriate sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines was
seventy-eight to ninety-seven months in prison.7 The court sentenced
Glover to eighty-four months imprisonment." Had the offenses been
grouped, Glover would have been subject to a sentencing range of sixty-
three to seventy-eight months imprisonment under the Guidelines. 74
The Seventh Circuit denied the claim of ineffective assistance at sen-
tencing, reasoning that, regardless of the merits of the grouping argu-
ment, the six to twenty-one month decrease that the defendant might
have received in sentencing was "not sufficiently significant to be cogni-
zable on collateral attack?"75
66 See id, at 1791.
67 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001).
68 Id. at 199-200.
69 See United States v. Granados, 168 F.3d 343, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Thompson, 27 F.3d 671, 677-78 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079,
1083-84 (3d Cir. 1991). Two circuits appear to have found prejudice when there was only a
possibility of an enhanced sentence if petitioner were later arrested and sentenced under a
repeat offender statute. See Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1465-66 (9th Cir. 1994).
7°
 Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Murray,
No. 97-6735, 1999 WI, 187192, at *5 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1999) ("[W] e conclude that the po-
tential change in sentence was sufficiently significant to render the proceeding unfair.");
Martin v. United States, 109 F.3d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the potential
change of sentence must be a significant amount in order to satisfy the prejudice prong);
United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1056 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen counsel's constitu-
tionally deficient performance results ... in a significantly greater sentence, the prejudice
element of Strickland is satisfied.").
71 See Glover, 531 U.S. at 200-01.
72 Id. at 201.
73 Id.
74
 Glover v. United States, No. 98-421, 1999 WL 511523, at *1 (7th Cir. July 15, 1999).
75 Id.
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Because the lower courts had not addressed the merits of the
grouping argument (and thus, by extension, also did not address the
performance prong of the Strickland test), the Supreme Court limited
its review in Glover to the prejudice issue." The Court rejected the sub-
stantial prejudice test, reasoning that "any amount of actual jail time
has Sixth Amendment significance."77
 But although the Glover Court
apparently assumed that the Strickland test applies to non-capital sen-
tencing," the opinion explicitly limited its holding to mandatory sen-
tencing regimes:
Although the amount by which a defendant's sentence is in-
creased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in
determining whether counsel's performance in failing to ar-
gue the point constitutes ineffective assistance, under a deter-
minate system of constrained discretion such as the Sentencing Guide-
lines it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice."
This limitation has taken on greater significance because, since
the Court decided Glover in 2001, the law surrounding mandatory sen-
tencing systems has changed dramatically. Specifically, the Court has
placed serious restrictions on the use of mandatory sentencing
schemes.
The change in mandatory sentencing began with Apprendi v. New
Jersey. 8° Apprendi involved a statutory sentencing enhancement that pro-
vided for an increase in the maximum sentence for the unlawful pos-
session of a firearm if the sentencing judge found that the defendant
possessed the firearm to intimidate someone because of her race. 81 The
79 Glover, 531 U.S. at 202, 205.
77
 Id. at 203.
79 See Michaels, supra note"65, at 1792 (noting that the Glover "opinion assumed, with-
out discussing, that the Strickland right to effective assistance of counsel applied at non-
capital sentencing proceedings, so the opinion provides no explanation of why Strickland
applies at sentencing"); see also Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006) (Graber,
J., concurring) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Strickland standard in
Glover). But see Davis, 443 F.3d at 1158 (observing that the Court has not delineated a
standard which should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in noncapital sen-
tencing cases"); Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) ('Since
Strickland, the Supreme Court has not decided what standard should apply to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the noncapital sentencing context. Consequently, there is
no clearly established law in this context.").
79 Glover, 531 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added); see Nate, Prejudice and Remedies: Establishing
a Comprehensive Frameteonit for Ineffective  Assistance Length-of-Sentence Claims, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2143, 2149 (2006) [hereinafter Prejudice and Remedies].
BD See 530 U.S. 466, 490-92 (2000).
81 Id. at 468-69,
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Court held that this enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury tria1,82 explaining that, "[o] ther than the fact of a prior convic-
tion, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."83 The Court extended this holding to
mandatory sentencing guideline regimes in Blakely v. Washington. 84 The
Blakely Court explained that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis
of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."85 In other
words, if a state wanted to create a mandatory sentencing regime that
limited a sentencing judge's discretion to a range narrower than the
statutory range, then factual findings that permitted a judge to sen-
tence above that narrow range had to be submitted to a jury. 86 if a sen-
tencing court was only permitted to sentence above that range based
on judge-found facts, then, the Court held, the sentencing regime vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment. 87
After the decision in Blakely, some states sought to modify their
sentencing systems to avoid constitutional problems. Some states
elected to adopt jury-fact-finding at sentencing, while others respond-
ing by stating that their sentencing guidelines were voluntary, rather
than mandatory. 88
The federal sentencing system has also changed significantly since
Glover. In United States v. Booker, the Court extended Apprendi to hold
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ran afoul of the Sixth Amend-
ment.89 The Court solved the Sixth Amendment problem by making
the Guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory." In other words, to
avoid the Sixth Amendment problem, the Court restored sentencing
discretion to trial judges.9' This solution avoids the constitutional prob-
82 Id. at 490-92.
83 Id. at 490.
84 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
95 Id.
86 See id. at 303-04.
al See id. at 304-05.
88
 See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing. 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 799-800 (2008) (listing states that have responded to Blakely by
sending sentencing facts to the jury and those that have responded by interpreting their
guidelines as voluntary).
99 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2003).
go See id. (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1) (2006)).
91
 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 28 (characterizing the Booker remedy as
"leav[ing] sentencing to district court discretion by making the Guidelines advisory and
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lem identified in Apprendi and Blakely because a factual finding is no
longer required to sentence above the Guideline range.92
Discretionary systems, such as the post-Booker federal system and
the post-Blakely systems adopted in some states, are nothing new. Dis-
cretionary sentencing has a long history in the United States." In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, a movement to limit the discretion of sen-
tencing judges94
 resulted in several estates and the federal criminal jus-
tice system adopting various types of mandatory sentencing systems."
[promoting] the uniformity intended by Congress through appellate review for reason-
ableness").
92 See Booker, 593 U.S. at 245.
93 Exactly when discretionary sentencing was adopted in the United States is a matter
of some dispute. There is, however, agreement that discretionary sentencing was the
American norm by the late nineteenth century. Hessick, supra note 11, at 131 n.183.
94 Critics of discretionary sentencing argued that defendants' sentences varied wildly
depending on the identity of the judge imposing the sentence, the temperament of the
judge on a particular day, or unwarranted prejudices held by the sentencing judge. See,
e.g., 11 1Auv IN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 12-49 (1973). For a
historical account of this movement and the major players, see KATE STrrn & Jost
CAItRANES, FEAR or JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN TIlE FEDERAL COURTS 29-48
(1998).
93 The binding effect of various systems differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues,
105 CoLum. L. REV. 1190, 1196-1206 (2005); Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. Rev. 155, 156-71 (2005). Some states provided judges with advisory
guidelines about sentence lengths, see Frase, supra, at 1198 (listing "voluntary" guidelines
jurisdictions, where sentences are not subject to appeal), while others developed presump-
tive sentencing guidelines. In these presumptive systems, legislatures or sentencing com-
missions identify a narrow presumptive sentence for the 'ordinary case" of a given crime.
Judges retain power to sentence above or below the presumptive sentence in an unusual
case, but these sentencing decisions are subject to appellate review. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentenc-
ing Reform in the States: An,Overview of the Colorado Law, 64 U. Coto. L. Rev. 645, 647 & n.10
(1993). The presumptive sentence often depends not only on the offense of conviction,
but also on an offender's prior record of convictions. Examples of such systems include
Arizona, California, and Washington, which created presumptive, mitigated and aggra-
vated sentences. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-604, 13-702 (2001 & Supp. 2008); WASH.
Rev. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 2003 & Supp 2009); see also Cunningham, 549 U.S. at
276-79 (describing the California system).
On the federal level, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 212(a) (2), 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 &
28 U.S.C.), which dramatically restricted the discretion of federal sentencing judges by
creating a sentencing commission to develop binding regulations named guidelines. The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines assigned narrow sentencing ranges for particular cases
within the broader statutory sentencing limits. These Guideline ranges were based on a
number of variables, including the offense of conviction, other circumstances surrounding
the offense, and the defendant's prior criminal convictions. The Guidelines provided for
various adjustments to the sentencing range based on the specific facts of the case, such as
the amount of drugs transported by a defendant found guilty of drug possession or a de-
fendant's motive in committing a crime. Judges were statutorily obligated to make factual
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Although discretionary non-capital sentencing was de rigueur for much
of the twentieth century, the law regarding ineffective assistance at sen-
tencing in those systems was not well developed—perhaps because the
shift to mandatory sentencing regimes coincided with the Court's ar-
ticulation of its ineffective assistance standard in Strickland.%
As noted above, Booker rendered the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines advisory and restored substantial discretion to sentencing judges.
And if states do not want to submit sentencing facts to a jury, then
judges must have the discretion to sentence up to the statutory maxi-
mum without making any additional factual fmding. 97
 In the wake of
these changes to sentencing regimes across the country—which ren-
dered several sentencing systems discretionary (at least in some sense
of the word)—it has become increasingly important to determine the
proper standard for reviewing the effectiveness of counsel in discre-
tionary sentencing systems. Because defendants are entitled to counsel
at a sentencing hearing,98
 they are entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel at that hearing. 99
 However, the Supreme Court has twice sug-
gested that ineffective assistance claims in discretionary or informal
sentencing regimes may be assessed differently. 199
 In at least one case it
appears that the government has argued that Glover does not apply to
post-Booker ineffective assistance at sentencing claims, 101 and, as dis-
cussed below, some lower courts have indeed employed different stan-
dards for assessing claims from mandatory sentencing systems or from
trial. The following. sections address the appropriate standard for
findings to determine whether these adjustments applied, and they were permitted to
sentence outside the Guideline range only under very limited circumstances. See Hessick &
Hessick, supra note 12, at 5.
u Strickland was decided in 1984, the same year that Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act.
• 97
 See generally Casey McTigue, Note, The Problem of Post-Cunningham Judicial Review:
The Impact of Gall, Kimbrough and Senate Bill 40 on California Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J.
GRIM, L 199 (2008) (discussing California's adoption of a discretionary sentencing system
in the wake of Cunningham).
9° See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739-
41 (1948).
99 Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.I4 (1970) (recognizing that "the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel").
1°() See Glover, 531 U.S. at 204; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87.
101
 See Jebara v. United States, No. 06-C-1137, 2007 WL 1183937, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Apr.
19, 2007) ("Noting that Glover arose under the 'determinate system of constrained discre-
tion' of the pre-Booker federal sentencing guidelines, the government argues that mere
guideline errors do not result in prejudice in the post-Booker world, in which the court has
greater discretion to impose a sentence outside the guidelines range." (citation omitted)).
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prejudice and the appropriate performance standard in discretionary
non-capital sentencing systems.
11. EVALUATING PREJUDICE AT SENTENCING
Because many sentencing systems are no longer mandatory in the
wake of Blakely v. Washington, and United States v. Booker, it is increasingly
important to determine the proper ineffective assistance standard for
discretionary (or advisory) sentencing systems. Language in Strickland
u Washington and Glover u United States suggests that a different ineffec-
tive assistance standard may be appropriate in discretionary non-capital
sentencing systems, and several courts have concluded that a height-
ened prejudice standard is appropriate in such systems. The courts that
have imposed these heightened standards appear to have done so be-
cause of a lack of substantive law restricting decision making in discre-
tionary non-capital sentencing systems, and because the sentencer can
make incremental sentencing decisions (e.g., increase or decrease a
sentence by small amounts). 1 °2 Those courts that have adopted more
rigorous prejudice requirements appear to be concerned about the
ease with which a defendant could demonstrate that her sentence
might have been marginally shorter. 103 In other words, these courts are
heightening the prejudice standard in order to serve a gatekeeping
function.
As explained below, any defendant who can demonstrate a reason-
able probability that her sentence was increased by any amount of actual
jail time should be deemed to have satisfied the prejudice prong of her
ineffective assistance claim. The hesitation to apply the "any amount of
actual jail time" standard for prejudice derives from courts' view that
prejudice is somehow different in discretionary sentencing. But, as this
Part explains, discretionary non-capital sentencing systems do not pre-
sent wholly unique questions of prejudice. And, even if the prejudice
standard proves easier to satisfy in practice for defendants in discretion-
ary non-capital sentencing systems, courts should not try to further
heighten the standard for demonstrating ineffective assistance at sen-
tencing because the costs associated with ordering a new non-capital
sentencing are relatively low. Also, given the procedural posture of most
ineffective assistance claims (i.e., that they are ordinarily brought as a
I" See, e.g., Buckley v. Slate, 76 S.W.3d 825, 832 (Ark. 2002); Young v. State, 699.S.W.2d
398, 399 (Ark. 1985).
163 See, e.g., Buckley, 76 S.W.3d at 832.
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collateral attack), only those defendants serving relatively. lengthy sen-
tences will bring ineffective assistance at sentencing claims.
A. Establishing a Prejudice Standard for Discretionary Non-capital
Sentencing Systems
If the prejudice standard for discretionary non-capital sentencing
systems were no different from the Court's present prejudice standard,
then any defendant who can demonstrate a reasonable probability that
her sentence was increased by any amount of actual jail time should be
deemed to have satisfied the prejudice prong of her ineffective, assis-
tance claim. 104 There are two major challenges posed to the application
of this prejudice prong by discretionary non-capital sentencing systems:
(a) the discretion possessed by the sentencer, and (b) the chronologi-
cal nature of sentencing decisions that allows sentencers to select any
sentence from within a range of time. Neither of these features is
unique to discretionary non-capital sentencing, as capital sentencers
possess considerable discretion, and chronological determinations are
a feature of mandatory systems. However, unlike capital sentencing and
mandatory noncapital sentencing discretionary non-capital sentencing
systems possess both features.
hi a mandatory sentencing system, the sentencer has little or no
discretion and thus the prejudice inquiry is relatively easy: because the
sentencing judge is bound to sentence according to certain rules and
standards, most deficiencies in counsel's performance will have an eas-
ily identified effect on the defendant's sentence. 105
 The effect of coun-
sel's performance on a defendant's sentence will be more difficult to
assess in a discretionary sentencing system because a judge may elect to
impose a particular sentence for any number of reasons, and it may not
be clear—even to the sentencing judge—how much weight was as-
signed to various sentencing factors. 106 If a reviewing court cannot say
with certainty how any particular argument or evidence affected a sen-
1" This test is simply a combination of Strickland's "reasonable probability" that the
outcome would have been different language, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, and Glover's
statement that "any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance," Glover,
531 U.S. at 203.
05 See Prejudice and Remedies, supra note 79, at 2150 (noting the "clear causal links" that
exist in determinate sentencing systems "between a sentence and defense counsel's con-
duct at the sentencing hearing").
loa See id. (Traditionally, judges in discretionary regimes have had great flexiblity in
choosing a punishment within a broad range of possible sentences, without having to pro-
vide any explanation for their decision.").
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tence, then it is difficult to assess the impact of counsel's performance.
In other words, because there are "fewer definite causal links" between
counsel's performance and the sentence imposed, the prejudice in-
quiry will be less straight-forward than in mandatory systems.'"
But the uncertain connection between counsel's performance
and the sentence imposed does not make ineffective assistance at sen-
tencing in discretionary systems unique. Similar uncertainty exists in
the capital-sentencing context and in the context of decisions made at
tria1. 108 Capital sentencing juries possess extraordinary discretion in
deciding whether to impose a sentence of life or death. Indeed, the
Supreme Court specifically stated that a capital sentencer may "not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Because juries do not articulate the reasoning behind their
decisions, there is no definite answer in capital cases whether counsel's
performance affected the sentence imposed, nor is there a definite an-
swer whether counsel's performance during the liability phase affected
the jury's decision regarding guilt or innocence. Indeed, it is why the
Strickland Court framed the prejudice inquiry in terms of "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." This "reasonable prob-
ability" standard is easily applied to non-capital discretionary sentenc-
ing: in order to assess prejudice, the Court need only determine "the
probability that a defendant would have received a shorter sentence" had
she received effective assistance."' This prejudice analysis requires a
court to "reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of
available mitigating evidence."
1 D7 see id.
198 See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
1" Id. (emphasis omitted).
110 466 U.S. at 694.
111 Prejudice and Remedies, supra note 79. at 2149; see id. at 2152 ("Strickland should be
understood to require only a reasonable probability of a shorter sentence for length-of-
sentence claims based on errors made at sentencing in a discretionary regime.").
112 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-
98 (2000). But see Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective As-
sistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 Comm!. L. REV. 1544, 1567-68 (1983) ("A sen-
tencing decision is made by weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence in a case;
the specific weight to be accorded that evidence is left to the sentencer, The result of the
balancing is known to the reviewing court but not the particular means by which that re-
sult was achieved. Consequently, any attempt to determine the likelihood that additional
elements would have altered that balance necessarily is speculative." (footnotes omitted)).
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But although capital sentencing juries have significant discretion,
sentencing in capital systems differs in another important respect from
discretionary non-capital systems—capital sentencing is essentially a
binary inquiry: should the defendant receive a sentence of the death
penalty or not? This binary nature is similar to the liability phase, where
the decisionmakermust only determine whether the defendant is guilty
or not guilty. A judge in a discretionary non-capital system, in contrast,
(or, in a few states, a sentencing jury)" 3 has the discretion to impose
any sentence on a particular defendant within the (often broad) statu-
tory range set by the legislature." 4
 Because criminal sentences are
measured chronologically, the non-capital sentencing judge can adjust
a defendant's sentence up or down by varying amounts to account for
various aggravating or mitigating factors." 5
Mandatory systems also contain some binary determinations—e.g.,
whether a defendant qualifies for a particular reduction or enhance-
ment." 6
 In addition, however, some mandatory non-capital sentencing
systems allow limited flexibility for the sentencer to select a sentence
within a particular range." 7 The pre-Booker Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, for example, permitted sentencing judges to select a sentence
from within a specified range."8
 Although the range was relatively cir-
cumscribed—the highest available sentence was generally no more
than twenty-five percent higher than the lowest available sentence—
judges enjoyed essentially unfettered discretion in selecting a sentence
within that range."9 And if a judge elected to depart from the Guide-
lines range, the amount of the departure (i.e., the difference in the
sentence imposed and the relevant sentencing range) was also largely
113
 See Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311, 314 &
n.16 (2003) (noting that six states currently employ jury sentencing in non-capital cases).
But cf. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
Study, 57 VANn, L. REV. 885, 897 (2004) ("Like so many other procedural rights, particu-
larly those associated with jury trial, the defendant's right to [non-capital] sentencing by
jury is in most cases not exercised but bargained away.").
114 See FRANKEL, supra note 94, at 7 (noting the "broad statutory ranges" and the sig-
nificant sentencing power thus left to judges).
113 See Hessick, supra note 11, at 132.
116 See e.g., STrn & CABRANES, supra note 94, at 83 ("Each step of a sentence calculation
under the [pre-Booker federal] Guidelines represent what madieMaticians call a 'minimal
pair': The judge must decide whether a given factor deemed relevant by the Sentencing
Commission is present or absent in the Case at hand.").
Ill See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4719(b) (2007).
118 STrrit & CABRANES, supra note 94, at 127 ("[T]he Guidelines explictly require
judge's to exercise discretion in setting the precise sentence within a particular Guidelines
range.")
Id. at 3, 127.
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left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.'" This (admittedly lim-
ited) chronological freedom in mandatory systems resembles the ability
of sentencers in discretionary systems to select any sentence within a
statutory range. 12 '
Having established that non-capital discretionary sentencing is not
unique in the discretion it affords sentencers nor in the non-binary na-
ture of sentencing decisions, it is worth conceptualizing how the preju-
dice determination might work in a discretionary system. If counsel, for
example, incorrectly overstates the number of prior convictions at a
sentencing hearing, and the judge later refers to this number when
imposing the sentence, then there is little doubt that the defendant has
been prejudiced. 122 Even if the sentencing judge does not refer to the
defendant's prior convictions in issuing the sentence, there is still a
strong argument that defense counsel's performance likely increased
the defendant's sentence. That is he.cause information on prior convic-
tions is ordinarily considered an important sentencing factor.'" Thus,
even though there is no direct evidence that counsel's error resulted in
a longer sentence, there is nonetheless a "reasonable probability" that
the defendant would have received a shorter sentence but for counsel's
deficient performance.
Of course, as with any ineffective assistance claim, to determine
the existence of prejudice a court must "consider the totality of the evi-
dence" that was presented at a non-capital sentencing. 124 When assess-
ing prejudice at a capital sentencing, for example, courts compare the
aggravating evidence against the available mitigating evidence. 125 This
analysis weighs not only the number of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors, but also the quality or weight of those factors. 126 •
Because the standards for prejudice established in Strickland and
Glover appear feasible for discretionary non-capital sentencing systems,
courts should find any defendant who can demonstrate a reasonable
IN Id. at 127.
121 Id.
122 See Prejudice and Remedies, supra note 79, at 2151 (noting that a defendant is preju-
diced when 'compelling case-specific circumstances suggest that defense counsel's errors
negatively affected the sentence").
123 See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
124 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365. 381 (1986).
122 Graham, supra note 46, at 1665.
126 Id. ("The presence or absence of overwhelming aggravating evidence is an impor-
tant part of this analysis, but whether prejudice will be found typically depends more on
the quality of the mitigating evidence that counsel inexplicably failed to discover or pre-
sen t."(foomote omitted)).
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probability that her sentence was increased by any amount of actual jail
time to have satisfied the prejudice prong.
B. Assessing Other Prejudice Standards
In the wake of Glover, some courts have applied heightened preju-
dice standards in discretionary non-capital sentencing systems. The Ar-
kansas state courts, for example, have held that only a defendant who is
sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence is capable of demon-
strating prejudice. 127
 The Fifth Circuit continues to employ its pre-
Glover prejudice standard in its.review of discretionary state sentencing
regimes—that is, it requires a state defendant to demonstrate that, but
for counsel's deficient representation, she would have received a "sig-
nificantly less harsh" sentence. 128 The only plausible explanation for
these heightened standards is to help dispose of (i.e., deny) many inef-
fective assistance claims. But such systems are in clear tension with
Glover's pronouncement that, in the ineffective assistance context, "any
amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance."129 In any
event, as explained below, the need for such a gatekeeping function
may well be overstated.
The State of Arkansas has a discretionary non-capital sentencing
system. The state uses a bifurcated jury system in which the jury that
convicts a defendant then hears arguments and deliberates regarding
the appropriate sentence.'" Although there is some statutory guidance
regarding relevant sentencing evidence, the statutory provision does
not piirport to exclude evidence as irrelevant to sentencing. 131
 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has held that prejudice at sentencing cannot be
demonstrated if the defendant "received less than the maximum sen-
tence for the offense charged. " 1" Thus, even in cases where counsel's
performance falls below constitutionally minimal standards, an ineffec-
tive assistance claim will be denied if the defendant received less than
127 See, e.g., Buckley, 76 S.W.3d at 832.
t28 See, e.g., Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 498 (5th Cir. 2005).
129
 531 U.S. at 203 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
I " ARK. CODE. ANN, § 16-97-101 (2006). A defendant who pleads guilty "with the
agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court, may be sentenced by a jury
impaneled for purposes of sentencing only." Id. § 16-97-101(6). Any defendant may waive
sentencing by jury, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court In
which case the court shall impose sentence." Id. § 16-97-101(5).
"I ARK. CODE ANN. §16-97-103 ("Evidence relevant to sentencing by either the court
or a jury may include, but is not limited to, the following „ ..").
"2 Smith v. State, 249 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Ark. 2007).
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the statutory maximum sentence.'" The Arkansas courts that have ap-
plied this "less than statutory maximum" standard have not provided
much of an explanation for the rule. 154
 In 2007, the Arkansas Supreme
Court suggested that this prejudice rule derives from the difference
between capital and non-capital cases.'" However, the Arkansas courts
do not appear to have explained why the prejudice rule' they have
adopted is appropriate in non-capital cases.
When a defendant argued that the Arkansas prejudice rule con-
flicted with the Supreme Court's "any amount of actual jail time”I"
standard from Glover, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
133 See id. Arkansas is not the only state that appears to place some emphasis on
whether the defendant received the statutory maximum sentence when analyzing preju-
dice. Other courts have identified the fact that a defendant's sentence fell below the statu-
tory maximum as suggestive that the defendant did not suffer prejudice. See, e.g., Madden
v. State, 991 So.2d 1231, 1238 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); People v. Hemmings, 808 N.E.2d 336,
340 (N.Y. 2004). Similarly, courts in other states have also stated that the imposition of a
maximum sentence is indicative of prejudice. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 115 S.W.3d 278,
286 (Tex. App. 2003); State v. Pote, 659 N.W.2d 82, 95 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). However,
courts ordinarily will not end the prejudice inquiry at a funding that the defendant re-
ceived the maximum statutory sentence. A defendant must still show a reasonable prob-
ability that she would have received a shorter sentence, and in cases where significant ag-
gravating factors were present, courts are unlikely to fmd such a probability. See Wood v.
State, 158 P.3d 467, 474 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007); Ch.apman v. State, Nos. 05-05-01349-CR,
05-05-01350-CR, 2007 WI.. 10560, at *3 (Tex. App. Jan. 3, 2007).
134 Most cases employing this prejudice standard simply cite previous cases. See. e.g.,
Bond v. State, No. CR-08-224, 2008 WL 4482233, at *5 (Ark. Oct. 2, 2008). Two cases in
particular are frequently cited. See Buckley, 76 S.W.3d at 832; Young, 699 S.W.2d at 399.
Prior to 2002, Arkansas courts sometimes found prejudice in cases where the jury had not
imposed the maximum sentence. See, e.g., Shells v. State, 733 S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1987). The earliest case that indicates a maximum sentence is necessary for a finding
of prejudice simply states (without citation): "the jury subsequently returned a sentence of
fourteen years, which was within the statutory range for either a class A or a class Y felony.
As a result, petitioner suffered no actual prejudice from the error." Young, 699 S.W.2d at
399.
1 " Small v. State, 264 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Ark. 2007) ("For claims of ineffective assistance
in the sentencing phase, in cases that do not involve the death penalty, a defendant who
has received a sentence less than the maximum sentence for the offense cannot show
prejudice from the sentence itself."). Arkansas courts have often stated, in assessing sen-
tencing ineffective assistance claims, that "death cases are inapposite where the circum-
stances of the case before the court concern charges that do not subject the defendant to
the possibility of the death penalty." Smith, 249 S.W.3d at 122. Many Arkansas Supreme
Court opinions appear to make this statement when distinguishing the performance
analysis of Strickland rather than the prejudice prong. See id. at 123; State v. Franklin, 89
S.W.3d 865, 870 (Ark. 2002). The Small opinion, however, characterized the distinction as
relevant to the prejudice inquiry. See 264 S.W.3d at 520.
136 531 U.S. at 203.
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In reversing the lower court's ruling, the [Glover] Court spe-
cifically noted a distinction between the situation in Glover and
a case where trial strategies, in retrospect, might be criticized
for leading to a harsher sentence. The distinction noted in
Glover is precisely what is at issue here—a matter of trial strat-
egy. There was no error in the calculation of the sentence it-
self; appellant argues that he would have received a less harsh
sentence if his attorney had chosen a different tactic concern-
ing the evidence submitted to the jury.'"
The Arkansas Supreme Court was, of course, correct that Glover
represented a case of undeniable prejudice—counsel's performance in
Glover resulted in a sentencing ruling that, if erroneous, could have
been corrected on appeal. But Glover does not state that appealable er-
ror is the only situation where a defendant is prejudiced; nor does it
state that a decision by counsel that leads to a harsher sentence is not
itself prejudicia1. 138
 Indeed, because this language from Glover is speak-
ing in terms of "trial strategy," it is arguably drawing a contrast about
counsel's performance, rather than a contrast about prejudice. Any
number of counsel's choices at trial or at sentencing may result in
prejudice to the defendant—i.e., an unfavorable verdict or a longer
sentence—but, if such choices are deemed reasonable strategy, then a
court will not label counsel's performance deficient; it will not affect any
determination regarding prejudice. Most important, nothing in Glover
suggests that a non-capital defendant must receive the maximum avail-
able sentence in order to demonstrate prejudice."9
Another possible explanation for Arkansas's prejudice rule is that,
when defendants are sentenced under a discretionary scheme, they are
not entitled to any particular sentence within the statutory range. If you
1" Buckley v. State, No. CR 06-172, 2007 WL 1509323, at *5 (Ark. May 24, 2007) (citing
Glover, 531 U.S. at 204).
138 Glover simply states:
We hold that the Seventh Circuit erred in engrafting this additional require-
ment onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland test. This is not a case where
trial strategies, in retrospect, might be criticized for leading to a harsher sen-
tence. Here we consider the sentencing calculation itself, a calculation result-
ing from a ruling which, if it had been error, would have been correctable on
appeal.
531 U.S. at 204.
1" To the contrary, the defendant in Glover received a sentence in the middle of what
the trial court believed to be the appropriate sentencing range. See 531 U.S. at 201. Be-
cause the Glover Court nonetheless found prejudice, Glover is arguably inconsistent with
the Arkansas approach.
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have no right to something, then it cannot serve as the basis for a claim
of prejudice."'" Indeed, one could argue that the U.S. Supreme Court's
statement in Lockhart v. Fretwell that prejudice exists only where coun-
sel's performance "deprive[d] the defendant of any substantive or pro-
cedural right to which the law entitles him, 941
 suggests that a straight-
forward application of the Glover standard to discretionary systems is
inappropriate. That is because, in contast to a defendant in a discre-
tionary system who has no expectation regarding sentence (aside from
the statutory range), a defendant in a mandatory system arguably has a
right to a particular sentence. 142
 This argument, however, proves too
much: Arkansas courts will find prejudice only when the sentencing
jury imposed the maximum sentence, but the defendant's exposure
upon conviction extends up to and including the statutory maximum."'
Thus, if prejudice exists only when the defendant has been deprived of
something to which she is entitled, then a statutory maximum sentence
also would not qualify as prejudice.'" This reasoning would necessarily
mean that there could be no prejudice in discretionary systems. But if
the right to counsel implies a right to effective counsel,' 45
 then there
must be a right to effective assistance in discretionary sentencing pro-
ceedings. In sum, either this argument based on the language in Lock-
"° See Cornett v. State, 267 P. 869, 871 (Okla. Crim. App. 1928) (citing Bishop v. Suite,
14 S.W. 88, 88 (Ark. 1890) for this proposition).
141
 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
"2 Cf. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 566 (2002). The Court explained:
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the defendant will never get
more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime, but they do
not promise that he will receive anything less than that. If ... the trial jury has
found . all the facts necessary to impose the maximum, ... [t]he judge may
select any sentence within the range ....
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). justice Scalia has also argued:
I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his contem-
plated crime he is exposing himself to a jail sentence of 30 years—and that if,
upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he may thank the mercy of a
tenderhearted judge .... But the criminal will never get more punishment
than he bargained for when he did the crime ....
Apprendi v. New jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, j., concurring).
143 See, e.g., Buckley, 76 S.W.3d at 832.
' 44
 This entitlement argument would equally apply to a ''Significant" or "substantial"
difference in a sentence, which, as explained infra, is the heightened standard that has
been adopted by the Fifth Circuit.
"2 See supra note 2.
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hart must be completely disregarded, or there can be no prejudice re-
quirement for discretionary systems. 146
One other possible explanation for the Arkansas rule may be
found in the fact that Arkansas has not only a discretionary sentencing
system, but also a system in which juries'clecide non-capital sentences. 147
When a sentence is imposed by a judge, there may be a record of the
judge's decision-making process that a reviewing court can analyze for
prejudice."8
 Such a record is not available in cases where juries impose
the sentence, and thus Arkansas courts may simply be using the statu-
tory maximum as a default to account for the lack of record. 149
 In other
words, the Arkansas prejudice rule may simply be designed to dispense
with the weighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at
sentencing, which facilitates quick disposition of cases.'"
Indeed, facilitation of quick disposition of ineffective assistance
claims seems to be the motivating factor behind the Fifth Circuit's
heightened prejudice standard for discretionary non-capital sentencing
systems. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Glover; the Fifth Cir-
cuit was one of the jurisdictions that employed a "significantly less
harsh" standard for the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance
claims.'" After the decision in Glover was announced, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that "the Supreme Court arguably cast doubt on the
Spriggs 'significantly less harsh' rule and may have impliedly rejected it
1" There is another reason to discount this reading of Lockhart. In Williams v. Taylor,
the U.S. Supreme Court characterized this language from Lockhart as requiring a defen-
dant to show not "a substantive or procedural right" to receive a less severe sentence (in
that case, a sentence of life rather than death), but rather a right to provide the sentencer
with the mitigating evidence that "trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer."
529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000).
147
 ARK. Cone ANN. §16-97-101 (2006); see Iontcheva, supra note 113, at 314 & n.16
(noting that Arkansas is one of only six states that currently employs jury sentencing in
non-capital cases).
1148 See, e.g., State v. Dickinson, No. 03 CO 52, 2004 WL, 2726057, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 26, 2004).
149
 No Arkansas decisions explictly make this distinction, but at least one Kentucky case
appears to employ a similar standard of prejudice, Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W3d 448,
457 (Ky. 2001) ("The fact that Appellant received the maximum sentence for the offense to
which he pled guilty satisfies the requirement of prejudice."), and Kentucky is another state
that uses sentencing juries, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (LexisNexis 1999).
150 q McClish, 962 S.W.2d at 334 ("Moreover, this Court has noted its unwillingness to
review the imposition of a sentence simply where the defendant maintains that his sen-
tence is excessive, when the sentence is within the range prescribed by statute for the of-
fense in question." (citing Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Ark. 1994)) (emphasis
added)).
151 See Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1993).
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in total." 152 The Fifth Circuit eventually concluded that Glover required
it to abandon the "significantly less harsh" rule in cases sentenced un-
der the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; 155 however, the court elected to
retain this rule in tate sentencing regimes [that] tend to be more
discretionary than the lockstep and predictable federal system." 154 The
Fifth Circuit justified the retention of this standard on administrability
grounds—i.e., a concern that "in jurisdictions without sentencing
guidelines, where courts typically possess a wide range of sentencing
discretion, reversal without a showing that 'the sentence would have
been significantly less harsh' would lead to an automatic rule of rever-
sal. "155
This same gatekeeping concern was one reason given in some pre-
Glover cases for requiring "substantial prejudice." 158 Courts expressed
concern that Strickland could turn into "an automatic rule of reversal in
the non-capital sentencing context." 157 The Seventh Circuit explained,
"almost any of counsel's actions has a potential effect on the sentence.
Small failings by counsel are not enough to turn a probable acquittal
into a probable conviction; equally slight failings could turn a 115
month sentence into a 120 month sentence." 158 The Seventh Circuit
also expressed a concern that, unless courts employ a significant preju-
dice standard in non-capital cases, the Sixth Amendment "becomes the
152 Reinhart, 357 F.3d at 531; Daniel v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d 697, 706 (5th Cir. 2002).
151 See United States v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 933, 437-38 (5th Cir. 2004).
154 Id. at 438 n.4; see Ward, 420 F.3d at 498 n.55 (noting that "Spriggs still applies in
cases involving state sentencing regimes").
155 Reinhart, 357 F.3d at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ward, 420 F.3d at
498.
I" Courts also adopted this substantial prejudice standard on the theory that because
Lockhart "reject[ed] the equation between causation and prejudice," the mere fact that
counsel's deficient performance caused a different sentencing decision was "not enough,
because not all effects are of equal weight." Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548, 550-51
(7th Cir. 1993). But these pre-Glover decisions failed to recognize that the Lockhart decision
to deny an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was made in a very narrow context—i.e.,
when the only prejudice defendant can demonstrate is that "he might have been denied a
'right the law simply does not recognize.'" Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment)). Following that decision, the Supreme Court clarified that a difference in out-
come would ordinarily satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and that the con-
trary result in Lockhart could be explained by the unique factual situation in that case.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-93; see Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 374 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(characterizing the decision in Lockhart as a "narrow holding" and asserting that the deci-
sion "will, in the vast majority of cases, have no effect on the prejudice inquiry under Strick-
land v. Washington").
157 Spriggs, 993 F.2d at 88; see Durrive,, 4 F.3d at 551.
in 4 F.3d at 550.
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means of vindicating on collateral attack all manner of arguments tin-
der rules and statutes."09
 Arguably, this more stringent prejudice stan-
dard is even more important in discretionary sentencing systems be-
cause "non-capital sentencing hearings, particularly in jurisdictions
without sentencing guidelines, typically involve wide sentencing discre-
tion" and "when the discretionary sentencing range is great, practically
any error committed by counsel could have resulted in a harsher sen-
tence."16°
This gatekeeping concern is essentially a concern about fmality-
that is, a concern that repeated claims about ineffective assistance will
waste scarce judicial resources.' 61 But finality concerns do not counsel
against revisiting any issue on collateral attack; rather finality counsels
that collateral attacks in criminal cases must strike a balance between
obtaining "correct" or fair outcomes and minimizing costs associated
with re-visiting issues that have already been litigated.' 62 The costs asso-
ciated with resentencing are minirna1, 163 especially as compared to the
costs of a new trial or the costs of a new capital sentencing proceed-
ing. 164 Thus, the desire to obtain a "correct" or fair sentence (that is, a
sentence imposed after adequate representation) need not be com-
promised in order to conserve resources, because the resources at stake
are minimal.
In any event, the need for a heightened prejudice standard is likely
overstated. For one thing, because the review of ineffective assistance
review is largely limited to collateral attacks, 165 those defendants serving
139 Id.
166 Spriggs, 993 F.2d at 88.
161
 For well-known examples of commentators who have stressed the importance of fi-
nality to conserve judicial resources, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 FIARY. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963); Henry J. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cut. L. REV. 142, 148-49
(1970).
162
 For example, when procedural default has "probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent" the U.S. Supreme Court has loosened its standards for when
habeas relief is available. See Jeffries & Stuntz, .taps note 9, at 685-86 (quoting Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)).
163 See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2d Cir. 2005); CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856 (3d ed. 2004).
I" See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283,
375 (2008) (noting the legal and factual complexity of capital cases, including the "limit-
less scope of a capital sentencing trial, with the whole range of potential arguments for
leniency available").
163 As Eve Brensike Primus has explained:
Although defendants can theoretically raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims on direct appeal, the vast majority of jurisdictions do not allow
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shorter sentences will be released before they can raise an ineffective
assistance at sentencing claim.' For another thing, as explained in
Part ill, the gatekeeping function for ineffective assistance in discre-
tionary sentencing claims is likely to be served by the performance
prong of the Strickland test..
HI. EVALUATING PERFORMANCE AT SENTENCING
Demonstrating deficient attorney performance is likely to prove
difficult in discretionary non-capital sentencing systems because there
is little substantive law in such systems. 167 As explained below, the two
most successful types of deficient performance claims—cases where
counsel based a decision on ignorance or misunderstanding of appli-
cable law, and cases where counsel failed to conduct an adequate inves-
tigation—both will depend in many circumstances on an evaluation of
counsel's conduct in light of relevant governing law Mandatory sen-
tencing systems are replete with substantive law that constrains sentenc-
ing discretion; and, although capital sentencers possess significant sen-
tencing discretion, capital sentencing law has received sustained
attention from courts and commentators, resulting in well-developed
capital sentencing law and principles.
defendants to open or supplement the trial court record to support these
claims. This prohibition has a devastating effect on defendants' ability to es-
tablish that they were deprived of adequate trial representation. Quite often,
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on what the trial attorney
failed to do. Therefore, information outside of the record is essential to sup-
port the claim and to show why the defendant was prejudiced as a result of
the trial attorney's deficient performance.
Primus, supra note 17, at 689. In 2003, in Massaro n United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that, because ineffective assistance claims often require defendants to supplement
the trial record, such claims typically should be raised for the first time on collateral re-
view. 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). Although this statement from Massaro was dicta and was
made in a federal supervisory decision rather than a constitutionally grounded one, many
lower federal courts have adopted its approach. In fact, most state courts ... requir[e]
defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in collateral review pro-
ceedings rather than on appeal." Primus, supra note 17, at 692.
166 Primus, supra note 17, at 693 ("[M]ost defendants have served their full sentences
by the time they reach the collateral review stage. Under the current system, only defen-
dants sentenced to more than four or five years in prison have an incentive to challenge
their convictions on collateral review, because it takes that long to exhaust the appellate
process in many jurisdictions.").
167 Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity
from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. Km/. 435, 441
(2002) ([Tine fundamental problem with traditional discretionary sentencing was the
absence of any defined sentencing law.").
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There is an. irony associated with ineffective assistance claims at
sentencing: the greater the discretion afforded to the sentencing judge
to identify mitigating factors and determine the final sentence, the
more important defense counsel's performance may be in reducing
her client's sentence. 168
 But the more discretion the sentencing judge
has, the more difficult it becomes for a defendant to obtain judicial re-
view of the adequacy of counsel's performance at sentencing. However,
as explained below, it is possible to construct a legal backdrop against
which to evaluate counsel's performance in discretionary non-capital
systems. In particular, ABA Standards, prevailing professional norms,
and other evidence of the perceived importance of or usual success rate
for particular mitigating arguments, though not sources of substantive
sentencing law, arguably provide additional information to assess the
adequacy of counsel's performance. 169
A. The Role of Substantive Law in Evaluating Performance
The two types of ineffective assistance claims for which courts ap-
pear most willing to question attorney performance are claims involv-
168 See Radish, supra note 64, at 808 (noting that "the very latitude of the power pos-
sessed by the sentencing court has been suggested as augmenting, rather than reducing,
the need for representation" at the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding); Richard H.
Kuh, Thai Techniques: Defense Counsel's Role in Sentencing, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 433, 433 (1978)
("As long as judges in criminal matters retain broad discretion in imposing sentences,
defense counsel's role may, if intelligently performed, do much to minimize that sentence
that the court may impose."); see also MOLLY LIZABETH ROTH, ADMIN. OFFICE oF 'rim U.S.
COURTS, FOUR STEPS TOWARDS BETTER ADVOCACY: APPROACHING YOUR CLIENT'S SEN-
TENCING ASTER BOOKER, RITA, GALL, AND KIMIIROUGII 1 (2008), available at http://www.
fd.org/pdf
 lib/Four Step Guide to Sentencing Hearing Preparation2.pdf ("Now that the
federal sentencing guidelines are advisory, representing your client at his or her sentenc-
ing hearing entails both greater freedom and greater responsibility.... This freedom re-
news and increases the responsibility defense lawyers have to present mitigating evidence
on behalf of their clients in creative, informative, and persuasive ways."); cf. Carter V. Illi-
nois, 329 U.S. 173, 178 (1946). The U.S. Supreme Court explained that: '
M he imposition of sentence presents quite different considerations. There a
judge usually moves within a large area of discretion and doubts.... It is a
commonplace that no more difficult task confronts judges than the determi-
nation of punishment not fixed by statute. Even the most self-assured judge
may well want to bring to his aid every consideration that counsel for the
acused can appropriately urge.
Id. But cf. Berman, supra note 167, at 445 (noting that mandatory sentencing systems that
are overly detailed or complex create many opportunities for counsel error).
168 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSN, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, standard 4-8.1(a) (3rd ed. 1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
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ing legal error and claims involving failure to investigate.'" Because
these claims turn on the substantive law in effect at the time of repre-
sentation, their resolution depends in large part on how much law"
there is in a particular sentencing system. The more guidance is given
to judges regarding how to exercise their sentencing discretion, the
more likely it becomes for a challenge to an attorney's performance to
succeed. In truly discretionary sentencing systems, therefore, where
there is little or no sentencing "law" to apply, almost any sentencing
decision can be labeled a sentencing "strategy," and thus shielded from
judicial review. ' 71
The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington indicated that the
ineffective assistance inquiry should perhaps look different for non-
capital sentencing than for trial or capital sentencing proceedings. 172
One concern the Strickland Court expressed is a matter of procedural
formality, as it noted that "an ordinary sentencing ... may involve in-
formal proceedings."'" In formal proceedings, such as capital sentenc-
ing and trial, "counsel's role in the proceeding is ... to ensure that the
adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the
standard governing decision. " 174 Although in the decades prior to
Strickland sentencing was seen as a proceeding built on the "modern
philosophy" of rehabilitation and thus procedural protections were
deemed less important,'" modern sentencing, at least in some jurisdic-
110 See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
"'Sec Berger, supra note 25, at 71 (explaining how "the broad exception for (or per-
haps more accurately, deference to) defense counsel's strategy and tactics" ensured that
"the route to reversal on the ground of attorney inadequacy would continue to be as nar-
row as the camel's proverbial path through the eye of the needle").
n2 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Citing this language from Strickland, the Ninth Circuit
held that "the Supreme Court has not delineated a standard which should apply to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims in noncapital sentencing cases. Therefore, ... there is no
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in this context." Davis
v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006); see Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236,
1244 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).
"3 966 U.S. at 686.
174 Id. at 687.
"3 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 297-48 (1949) (rejecting Due Process
Clause challenge to death sentence based on hearsay allegations that defendant was not
given the opportunity to challenge prior to sentencing on the ground that looser eviden-
tiary rules were necessary at sentencing to achieve the progressive goals of "(deformation
and rehabilitation of offenders" through individualized sentencing). As Doug Berman has
explained, during this time, Is' en tencing was conceived procedurally as a form of admin-
istrative decisionmaking in which sentencing experts, aided by complete information
about offenders ... were expected to craft individualized sentences almost like a doctor or
social worker exercising clinical judgment." Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentenc-
ing, 2005 U. CI11. LEGAL F. 1, 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Berman notes:
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Lions, has rejected rehabilitation as the dominant penal philosophy and
has become more formal over time.' 76
 Convicted defendants are enti-
tled to various constitutional protections at sentencing, 177
 and some
jurisdictions provide further procedural protections through rules or
common law. 178
 Notably, there is a constitutional right to counsel at
sentencing, 179
 and it is generally understood that the prosecutor and
[11 his model of sentencing was formally and fully conceptualized around the
rehabilitative ideal. Trial judges were afforded broad discretion in the imposi-
don of sentencing terms, and parole officials exercised similar discretion con-
cerning prison release dates, for a clear and defined purpose: to allow sen-
tences to be tailored to the rehabilitation prospects and progress of each
individual offender.
Id. at 3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176
 See e.g., Berman, supra note 175, at 8-15; Michaels, supra note 65, at 1772-76; see also
Kuh, supra note 168, at 434-35 (describing modern progression towards allowing counsel
to be present at presentence interview and defense counsel's right to inspect the presen-
tence report).
177 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (holding that, other than
fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable
doubt); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999) (establishing the right to re-
main silent at non-capital sentencing proceeding); Pollard v United States, 352 U.S. 354,
361 (1957) (assuming arguendo that the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee applies
at sentencing); see also United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be physically present at sen-
tencing); Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that a defen-
dant has a constitutional right to allocute at sentencing); Sae v. Peters, 950 F.2d 469, 477
(7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the "narrowly limited" right to trial counsel of choice
applies at sentencing); In rewash, Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
that the public right to an open trial extends to cover sentencing proceedings); Havri-
lenko v. Duckworth, 661 F. Supp. 454, 961 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (concluding that defendant
had a right under Fare= v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975), to proceed pro se at
sentencing); United States v. Feeney, 501 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (D. Colo. 1980) (requiring
the government to disclose material that could potentially mitigate the defendant's sen-
tence). See generally Michaels, supra note 65.
178 See Pens v, Bail, 902 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the exclusionary rule
at sentencing); Marshall v. State, 27 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Ark. 2000) (noting that the introduc-
tion of evidence during the sentencing stage "must be governed by our rules of admissibil-
ity and exclusion; otherwise, these proceedings would not pass constitutional muster"); see
also FED. R. Cunt. P. 32(i) (1)(C) (requiring that the parties be given an opportunity "to
comment on the probation officer's determinations and other matters relating to an ap-
propriate sentence"); MICH. CT. R. 6.925(E) (1) (c) (giving defendant a right to allocute at
sentencing); PA, R. Cum& P. 703 (instructing that counsel be given access to all presen-
tence reports and related reports, and providing for correction of "any factual inaccuracy"
in such reports); HARRY I. SURIN, BARRY H. BERKE & ERIC A. TIRscHwEI,1„ THE PRACTICE
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 484-505 (2006) (describing pro-
cedural aspects of the federal sentencing process).
179
 Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137
(1967).
1102	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 50:1069
defense counsel function as advocates during the sentencing proceed-
ing so that the sentencing authority will engage in "a balanced and
thorough effort to determine the 'right' sentence, within the range of
prescribed penalties.'180
The presence of procedural differences in non-capital sentencing
proceedings was not the only reason the Strickland Court identified as
possibly distinguishing the proper assessment of counsel's perform-
ance.181 The Court also noted that the "standardless discretion in the
sentencer ... may require a different approach to the definition of
constitutionally effective assistance:182 Whether performance is rea-
sonable depends on the rules proscribed by law. 183 When increased dis-
cretion vested in the sentencing judge corresponds to a lesser amount
of substantive law, there is less law to control the sentencing proceed-
ing, and consequently, the performance evaluation of counsel.
In mandatory sentencing systems the performance inquiry is rela-
tively straightforward: there is a "correct" sentence or range of sen-
tences, and if defense counsel failed to provide information relevant to
the calculation of that sentence or range or if she failed to object to the
sentencing judge's miscalculation, then counsel provided deficient rep-
resentation. Under the pre-Booker federal guidelines, for example, a
defendant's sentence depended upon an assessment of facts surround-
ing the offense and a calculation of the defendant's criminal history. 184
There were a finite set of enumerated reasons for which a defendant's
sentence could be adjusted either up or down. 188 If defense counsel
failed to identify a reason for a downward adjustment, or if she failed to
object to an erroneous upward adjustment, then her performance al-
most always would be judged deficient. 188
18° Michaels, supra note 65, at 1776; see Menzpa, 389 U.S. at 135 (noting that "the neces-
sity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of. mitigating cir-
cumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent").
181 See 466 U.S. at 686.
102 Id.
185 See infra text accompanying notes 199-209.
11/4 See id.
185 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 5.
186 See, e.g., United States v. Lockart, Nos. 05cr30, 08cv141, 2008 WL 4372862, at *4
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2008) ("Although the initial error was that of the probation officer, the
Brown case which the government and the probation officer concede are controlling was
decided two years before defendant's sentencing and could have been the basis for a suc-
cessful objection to the application of the § 2K2.1 (b) (5) adjustment at sentencing. Coun-
sel was therefore constitutionally ineffective for his failure to object, and defendant is enti-
tled to be resentenced."); United States v. Buckmaster, No. 1:06 CR 0038, 2008 WL
2497586, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2008) ("Counsel's legal error which results in an in-
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In contrast, discretionary sentencing systems do not prescribe any
particular sentence for a defendant. Because sentencing judges in dis-
cretionary systems possess the discretion to select from a variety of sen-
tences, and because the sentence selected may be based on a variety of
reasons, it is not nearly as easy to identify circumstances where an at-
torney's performance can be labeled deficient. When assessing the per-
formance prong in discretionary sentencing systems, however, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that not all discretionary sentencing systems
are the same. The more structure a system has, the easier it should be
for a court to measure the reasonableness of counsel's performance.
Take, for instance, sentencing systems that "channel" the discretionary
sentencing power of a judge. In the post-Booker federal system, judges
are required to calculate the sentencing range prescribed by the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines. 187
 Although a judge is not bound by that
range, the post-Booker sentencing regime presumes that this range
serves as the starting point or initial benchmark for the judge's ultimate
sentencing decision, and if a judge fails to begin her sentencing analysis
with a proper Guidelines calculation, then the sentence is reversible for
procedural error."6
 To the extent that defense counsel fails to provide
effective assistance in connection with the calculation of the advisory
range, 189 or other procedural requirements,'" then her performance
will be judged deficient."'
crease in his client's prison sentence constitute both deficient performance and prejudice
under Strickland."). But see United States v. Quackenbush, 369 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 n.4
(W.D. Tenn. 2005) ("For purposes of this order, the Court assumes that any failure to ob-
ject to an error in the presentence report ... satisfies the first prong of Strickland. In light
of the complexity of the guidelines at issue here, and the fact that any error by the experi-
enced probation officer who prepared the report overlooked by the Government and this
judge, it is far from clear that that assumption is correct.").
187
 See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007) (IA] district court should
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines
range.").
188 See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007). But see
United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding harmless error in the
erroneous application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2C1.1 (2008)); United
States v. Quinlan, No. 08-1388, 2008 WI. 5395981, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2008) (finding
harmless error in the event that the defendant was improperly denied credit for accep-
tance of responsibility).
no E.g., Potts v. United States, 566 F. Su pp. 2d 525, 539-41 (N.D. Tex. 2008). But see su-
pra note 101.
Igo See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (discussing possible procedural errors in post-Booker sen-
tencing).
191
 E.g., Lockhart, 2008 WL 4372862, at *4; Buckmaster, 2008 WL 2497586, at *2; cf.
Rom, supra note 168, at 2 ("ES] ince the guidelines are one factor of many which must be
considered by courts, lawyers must be able to navigate through them.").
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Discretionary non-capital sentencing systems that explicitly identify
relevant aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors also provide an
easy standard against which to measure counsel's performance at sen-
tencing. 192 North Carolina, for example, provides for the mitigation of
a defendant's sentence if she "has been honorably discharged from the
United States armed services." If a defendant proves this mitigating
factor, a court's refusal to consider it or failure to indicate that the fac-
tor has been considered may result in an appellate finding of error and
remand for a new sentencing hearing.'" In these two examples—the
calculation of the advisory sentencing range in the federal system and
the identification of prior military service in the. North Carolina sys-
tem—the deficiency in counsel's performance is indistinguishable from
a deficiency in a mandatory sentencing system. If it would be legal er-
ror for the sentencing court not to impose a lower sentence, then
counsel's failure to raise the argument that would have resulted in the
lower sentence likely rendered her performance deficient. 195
Even in systems that do not require sentencing judges to consider
particular types of evidence or information at sentencing, there may
nonetheless be some substantive sentencing law that guides their sen-
tencing discretion. For example, the Tennessee state courts have identi-
fied a defendant's "honorable military service" as a mitigating sentenc-
ing factor. 196 Although Tennessee courts are permitted to consider prior
military service as a mitigating factor, in contrast to the North Carolina
system, Tennessee courts are not obligated to impose a shorter sen-
tence. 197 If Tennessee sentencing counsel neglects to investigate
192 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e) (14) (2007).
193 Id.
194 See State v. Clark, 377 S.E.2d 54, 68 (N.C. 1989); State v. Heath, 335 S.E.2d 350,
355-56 (MC Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hanes, 334 S.E.2d 444, 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
' 0 Cf. Glover, 531 U.S. at 204 (noting that the issue in question was counsel's per-
formance during a "sentencing calculation ... a calculation resulting from a ruling which,
if it had been error, would have been correctable on appeal").
196 See, e.g., State v. Hill, No. M2004-00597-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 544710, at *9 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 27, 2005). Although the relevant state sentencing statute does not men-
tion military service, the Tennessee appellate courts have read a statutory catch-all provi-
sion as permitting a sentencing court to consider an offender's military service. See id.
(citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(13) (2006)); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are
Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Fadorsr, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (2008).
197 E.g., State v. White, No. W2006-00655-CCA-R3CD, 2007 WL 836812, at *5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2007) ("[WI bile the trial court may consider military service as a miti-
gating factor, this court has held that a trial court's refusal to mitigate a defendant's sen-
tence based on past military service was not error. Thus, the trial court was within its dis-
cretion in refusing to consider the defendant's military service as a mitigating factor."
(internal citations omitted)).
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whether the defendant served in the armed forces, the defendant would
presumably have a viable failure to investigate claim (assuming that the
defendant had, in fact, rendered "honorable military service"). Even
though it would not have been legal error for the sentencing court to
disregard the military service when imposing sentence, because such
service has been identified as potentially mitigating then counsel's fail-
ure to investigate is likely to be deemed deficient performance. That is
because the identification of military service as an available mitigating
factor suggests that a court is likely to reduce a defendant's sentence if
she has rendered such service, and counsel has an obligation to conduct
investigations that are likely to be fruitful. 198
Fully discretionary systems—i.e., systems where a judge's sentenc-
ing discretion is not limited or guided in the manners described
above—pose the greatest challenge for the performance prong of the
Strickland standard because where a judge can rely on any number of
considerations in making her sentencing decision, there are an infinite
number of arguments that counsel could make in an attempt to influ-
ence that decision.'" In this respect, counsel's performance at fully dis-
cretionary sentencing proceedings more resembles trial performance
than it resembles sentencing proceedings for mandatory or guided dis-
cretion sentencing systems. At trial, counsel can ordinarily select from
any number of approaches to defend her client. Courts will rarely ques-
tion counsel's trial decisions because when counsel selects between a
number of possible arguments, courts ordinarily defer to that decision
as a matter of trial strategy. 20° Although this does not mean counsel
cannot render deficient performance at sentencing, the dearth of sub-
stantive sentencing law in fully discretionary sentencing systems will
199 "Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigat-
ing evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentenc-
ing." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003). Strickland does, however, require counsel
"to make reasonable investigations." 466 U.S. at 691. The reasonableness of counsel's in-
vestigatory efforts appear to be assessed according to whether "a reasonably competent
attorney [would have] investigate[d] further." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. And because attor-
neys are most concerned about obtaining a favorable outcome for their clients, reasonably
competent attorneys presumably conduct investigations that are most likely to yield evi-
dence that will assist in that goal.
199 As of 2005, only eighteen states and the District of Columbia had adopted sentenc-
ing guidelines, voluntary, advisory, or mandatory. See Frase, supra note 95, at 1191.
2" See Richard Van Rheenen, Inequitable Treatment of Ineffective Assistance Litigants, 19
IND. L. REV. 159, 159 (1986) ("The courts will not ... question an attorney's conduct if it is
baied on reasoned trial tactics or strategies."); see also supra note 38.
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limit the ability of defendants to demonstrate that a failure to investi-
gate was unreasonable or that counsel committed legal error."'
To understand the unique challenges raised by fully discretionary
systems, it may be most fruitful to begin with legal error challenges.
Those claims are successful when a defendant can demonstrate that her
attorney's decisions were based, not on strategy, but on a misunder-
standing or lack of knowledge of relevant law. In fully discretionary sys-
tems, there is little substantive sentencing law—i.e., laws indicating
what are appropriate or inappropriate sentencing considerations. 202
The only limitation on the length of a sentence in fully discretionary
sentencing systems is that a defendant may not receive a sentence
above the maximum penalty specified by statute nor, when applicable,
below the statutory minimum. A sentencer may select any sentence
within the statutory range so long as it is not based on materially false
information or on constitutionally impermissible considerations, such
as race.2Q3 In such a system, an attorney could make a legal error with
respect to sentencing procedures (such as failing to file objections to
the presentence report), or might mistakenly believe that the law lim-
ited the evidence that could be presented to the sentencing judge." 4
But, aside from these procedure-related errors, where there is little law
governing a situation, it is difficult to run afoul of that law. 205
In contrast to legal error claims, ineffective assistance claims in-
volving counsel's failure to investigate are not wholly dependent on the
existence of substantive law. For example, if defense counsel were com-
pletely unfamiliar with the facts of her client's case and failed either to
present any case in mitigation or to rebut the prosecution's aggravation
case due to that ignorance, courts would likely conclude that such utter
lack of preparation constituted deficient performance. 206 But although
201 As mentioned above, these are the most successful forms of deficient performance
claims. See supra notes 14-60 and accompanying text.
"2 See Berman, supra note 167, at 441.
203 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 12, at 4.
204 For example, some federal courts have found deficient performance where counsel
failed to raise the issue that Booker permitted sentencing judges discretion to sentence
below the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Stallings v United States, 536 F.3d 624, 625
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding that counsel's performance on direct appeal was deficient be-
cause she failed to raise a claim under Booker); Richardson v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 2d
392, 399 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to file sup-
plemental briefs on appeal regarding Booker).
2°5 In contrast, mandatory sentencing systems that are overly detailed or complex cre-
ate many opportunities for counsel error. See Berman, supra note 167, at 445.
206 See,	 In re Morris, 658 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Wash. App. 1983) (holding that defen-
dant is entitled to counsel familiar with her case at sentencing hearing).
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substantive law may not be relevant to cases of utter lack of preparation,
it may play a significant role in cases where a defendant claims that atf
attorney's failure to conduct a particular type of investigation or to in-
vestigate a particular type of evidence constituted deficient perform-
ance. In discretionary non-capital systems, one of the main difficulties
in assessing failure to investigate claims will be the identification of
what types of mitigation arguments defense attorneys should be investi-
gating. That is because "Strickland does not require counsel to investi-
gate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how
unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing."207
Thus, substantive law may be indispensable in the evaluation of some
failure to investigate claims because unless the defendant demonstrates
that counsel failed to investigate evidence that would likely have been
treated as mitigating, the failure to investigate is not unreasonable. 208
However, the Supreme Court's analysis of failure to investigate claims in
recent death penalty cases suggests that there may be other sources that
identify mitigating evidence, aside from substantive law, that a defen-
dant could use to support a failure to investigate claim. These other
non-substantive law sources allow courts to evaluate the reasonableness
of counsel's decision not to investigate mitigating evidence based on
the perceived importance or usual success rate of a particular mitigat-
ing argumen t."9
There is some substantive law identifying aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors in capital-sentencing systems. States are constitutionally re-
quired to identify aggravating sentencing factors that may result in the
imposition of the death penalty. 21° Although .there is no similar consti-
tutional requirement for mitigating factors, many capital-sentencing
statutes identify a limited number of mitigating factors and also include
a "catchall" provision that permits the sentencer to consider any other
287
 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533.
408 See, e.g., Potts, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37. At this point the questions of performance
and prejudice appear to merge a bit, but courts often (though not always) treat questions
of what counsel should have investigated as questions of performance rather than ques-
tions of prejudice, and thus this Article will do the same.
2" The Court suggested as much in Glover; when it noted that "the amount by which a
defendant's sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in
determining whether counsel's performance in failing to argue the point constitutes inef-
fective assistance." 531 U.S. at 204.
210
 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) ("[O]ur cases have insisted that
the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is
a fundamental constitutional requirement ....").
1108
	
Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 50:1069
potentially mitigating facts. 2" Although states are required to limit
their identification of capital aggravating factors in order to ensure that
the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary manner, 212 states are
required to permit capital sentencers to consider any aspect of the de-
fendant's background, character, or crime as a mitigating factor. 213 One
might think that Strickland's admonition that counsel need not investi-
gate "every conceivable line of mitigating evidence" would limit failure
to investigate claims to the types of mitigating evidence identified in a
particular jurisdiction's capital sentencing statute. However, in its re-
cent ineffective assistance at capital sentencing cases—Williams v. Taylor,
Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard—the Supreme Court found defi-
cient performance even though some of the mitigating evidence coun-
sel failed to investigate and discover was not identified as a mitigating
factor in the relevant state statute. 214 The Court held that counsels' fail-
2" James R. Acker & Charles S.'Lanier, In Fairness and Merry: Statutory Mitigating Factors
in Capital Punishment Laws, 30 GRIM. L. Butt- 299, 339-41 (1994); Carol S. Steiker & Jor-
dan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital
Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 848 (1992).
212 See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.
2' 5 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318-19 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 211, at 839; Hessick, supra note 196, at 1126 ("The Court's
defmition of mitigating factors ... places virtually no substantive limitations on the con-
cept of mitigation.").
211 In Williams u Taylor, the Supreme Court faulted counsel's failure to investigate Wil-
liams' 'nightmarish childhood," or discover that Williams was "borderline mentally re-
tarded," had committed several good deeds in prison (including helping to crack a prison
drug ring and returning a guard's wallet), and was considered by prison officials as the
least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or provocative way." 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000).
Because counsel failed to investigate these factors, the Court held that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient. Two of these factors—deprived childhood and post-offense good acts—
were not included as potential mitigating factors in the operative Virginia statute. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (2008).
In Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that counsel was ineffective in failing to
investigate Wiggins' family and social history. 539 U.S. at 534-535. The Court also refer-
enced time that Wiggins spent homeless and "his diminished mental capacities" as "further
augmenting] his mitigation case." Id. at 535. The Court noted that evidence of a defen-
dant's "troubled history" may be "relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability." Id.
The relevant state statute identified diminished mental capacity as a mitigating factor, but
did not identify either deprived childhood or homelessness as mitigating factors. See Mu.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h) (2) (LexisNexis 2002).
In Rompilla v. Beard, the Supreme Court criticized counsel's failure to investigate Rom-
pilla's abusive childhood and mental health. 545 U.S. 374, 391-92 (2005). But although
the state capital-sentencing statute identified a defendant's substantially impairment to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law" as a relevant mitigating factor, family and social background was not identified. 42 PA.
Cons. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e) (West 2006).
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ure to investigate in those cases was deficient, not because they failed to
uncover evidence that the substantive law identified as mitigating, but
because ABA Standards, prevailing professional norms, and the Court's
own decisions had identified either the method of investigation or the
particular piece of undiscovered evidence as important.
The perceived importance or usual success rate of a particular
mitigating argument may be more difficult to identify in non-capital
systems than in capital systems. That is because the legal landscape sur-
rounding capital punishment is far better developed than the law sur-
rounding discretionary non-capital systems. 215
 The Court requires states
to promulgate substantive law to guide the discretion of capital juries. 216
Specifically, jurisdictions must provide a finite list of specific aggravat-
ing factors that warrant application of the death penalty in order to
"minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious" sentencing deci-
sions, 217
 and to ensure that the death penalty is only given to "the worst
of the worst."218
 The Court has also forbidden the application of a
mandatory death penalty, 219
 and it conducts rigorous proportionality
review to determine whether the imposition of the death penalty is in-
consistent with the Eighth Amendment under various circumstances. 22°
These limitations on the imposition of capital punishment stand in
stark contrast to the Court's non-capital jurisprudence: legislatures may
limit non-capital sentencing discretion (or not) as they see fit; 221 the
Court has repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of non-capital man-
/15 CI Berman, upra note 3, at 868 ("After having virtually no capital cases on its mer-
its docket for most of its history, the Supreme Court has over the last three decades adju-
dicated, on average, six capital cases each and every term.").
216 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Barkow,
supra note 6, at 8-10; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 211, at 859-64.
217
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (3-3-1-2 decision) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens,,]]., announcing the judgment of the Court).
218 See Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 EIARV.
L. REY. 1599, 1604 & n.40 (2001) (collecting sources using this phrase).
212
 Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, jj., announcing the judgment of the
Court); see Barkow, supra note 6, at 10-11; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 211, at 842-44.
2" For a recent example of the Court's searching proportionality review in capital
cases, see Kennedy u. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649-65 (2008). See also Barkow, supra note
6, at 11-14; Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L.
REV. 677, 688-92 (2005).
421 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603 (plurality opinion) (IL)egislatures remain free to de-
cide how much discretion in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury in non-
capital cases . . . ."); see also Barkow, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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datory sentences; 222
 and although the Court has purported to apply a
"narrow proportionality principle" to non-capital sentences,223 it has
interpreted this principle. so narrowly that it "all but defines the right
against excessive punishment out of existence." 224 In addition to provid-
ing more protection for capital defendants at sentencing, the Court's
decisions in these areas have also resulted in a robust capital sentencing
jurisprudence. This well-developed substantive law allows for more
searching judicial review of the adequacy of counsel's performance in
capital cases.
In addition to the lopsided development of substantive law, the
professional standards for representing non-capital defendants are not
as well developed as the standards for representation of capital defen-
dants. The ABA has "made a concerted effort to improve the quality of
representation afforded capital defendants," including the promulga-
tion of "detailed guidelines for attorneys representing capital defen-
dants."225 Although the ABA has also promulgated guidelines for the
representation of non-capital defendants, the standards for capital rep-
resentation are significantly longer and more specific. 226 For example,
although the non-capital standards generally advise counsel to "submit
to the court and the prosecutor all favorable information relevant to
sentencing, "227 the capital standards specifically recommend various
types of witnesses that counsel should consider calling at the sentencing
phase, as well as a' list of potential mitigation topici counsel should con-
sider raisin 028
222 See, e.g.. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 995-96 (1991).
225 Ewing 538 U.S. at 20.
224 Lee, supra note 220, at 695; see Barkow, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that in reality,
"the Court has rejected noncapital sentences in only a small handful of cases, all of which
are decades old and all but one of which involve facts that go beyond the term of incar-
ceration").
225 WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH 3-4 (2006) ("Among
other things, the ABAJ has promulgated detailed guidelines for attorneys representing
capital defendants, and it has persuaded state legislatures to adopt provisions designed to
improve the quality of capital defense lawyers' representation.").
226 Compare ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Gunn:LINE 10.11—.12 (2003), with ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4.81 (3d ed. 1993).
227 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: l'ItosccuTioN FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 4.81 (b).
226 ABA GUIDELINES FOR Tit E APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES GUIDELINE 11.8.3(F) (1989). The reference to "potential mitigation top-
ics" in the 1989 version of the ABA's Guidelines was omitted from the most recent version
of the Guidelines.
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Nonetheless, as described in the subsequent section, some guid-
ance regarding counsel's performance at discretionary non-capital sen-
tencing proceedings either exists or could be created. Such extra-
statutory guidance for counsel's performance and mitigation evidence
could allow courts to better review claims of deficient performance on
the part of sentencing counsel. And, more importantly, it may also
serve an educative function that could improve performance of coun-
sel at sentencing, rather than simply improving the judicial review of
ineffective assistance claims—that is, help sentencing counsel to render
effective assistance in the first instance.
B. Looking Beyond Substantive Law far Performance Standards
As explained above, because there is little substantive law in discre-
tionary non-capital sentencing systems, the performance prong is likely
to prove difficult for. defendants with ineffective assistance at sentenc-
ing claims to satisfy if they were sentenced in such systems. The Su-
preme Court's willingness to review counsel's performance in the capi-
tal sentencing context—where the sentencing jury retains wide
discretion—demonstrates, however, that this dearth of substantive law
does not make deficient performance impossible to prove. In the re-
cent capital cases of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the Court judged
counsel's representation to be deficient because counsel failed to inves-
tigate various mitigating evidence, even though the relevant substantive
law (i.e., the states' capital sentencing statutes) did not indicate that
such evidence was necessarily mitigating. 2
 In these cases, the Court
appears to have been comfortable judging the adequacy of counsel's
performance because one or more of the following were present: (a)
ABA Guidelines regarding the tasks attorneys should undertake, (b)
prevailing practice in the location at the time suggesting that the tasks
were necessary or appropriate, or (c) existing case law noting the im-
portance of the missing evidence in capital sentencing decisions. As
discussed below, similar guidance either exists in some form or could
be created for discretionary non-capital sentencing, so as to permit
similar review of counsel's performance at non-capital sentencing pro-
ceedings.
Before explaining how this review could be conducted in the dis-
cretionary non-capital systems, a word of caution is appropriate. Al-
though the Supreme Court's use of the Strickland standard in Glover u
229 See supra note 214.
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United States, suggests by implication that it will evaluate capital and
non-capital ineffective assistance claims similarly, 230
 ineffective assis-
tance may ultimately be one of the areas where the judiciary treats capi-
tal cases differently than non-capital cases. 2" It has oft been repeated
that "death is different,"232
 and the Supreme Court's "capital sentenc-
ing jurisprudence departs from its noncapital sentencing case law in
the most fundamental ways."233
 Indeed, some commentators have con-
cluded that the Court is, at least in practice, employing a higher level of
scrutiny for ineffective assistance at sentencing claims in capital cases. 254
The Supreme Court's tendency to hear a disproportionately high
number of death penalty eases233
 has resulted in the development a
relatively robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for capital (but not
non-capital) cases. 236 The Court relied on that jurisprudence in Wiggins
when assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance. Specifi-
cally, the Wiggins Court noted that counsel's failure to investigate the
defendant's personal history resulted in the oversight of evidence that
defendant had suffered extreme physical and sexual abuse— "the kind
of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant's
moral culpability.'"2" Because non-capital sentencing has historically
2" See supra note 78.
231 The first effective assistance of counsel case, Powell v. Alabama, lends support to this
hypothesis. See generally 387 U.S. 45 (1932). Although the Supreme Court intervened to
prevent the imposition of the death penalty on defendants who appeared to be innocent
of the crime of which they were accused, it declined to review the defendants' case on a
subsequent occasion when the penalty imposed after retrial was less than death. See Klar-
man, supra note 2, at 4, 14, 27-28.
232 See Note, supra note 218, at 1599 ("That `death is different' from other penalties the
state may impose has become an axiom of American law."). For discussions of the origins
of this concept and phrase, see id. at 1599 n.l. See also Barkow, supra note 6, at 3 n.l.
233 Barkow, supra note 6, at 3.
231 E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address at the Honorable James J. Gilvary Sym-
posium on Law, Religion & Social Justice: Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003—Ls the
Death Penalty on Life Support?, in 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 201, 217 (2004); Gershowitz,
supra note 58, at 53; Smith, supra note 164, at 370; see Eric M. Freedman, Giarrantano Is a
Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
1079, 1100 (2006) (noting that death penalty cases are the only recent cases in which the
Court has found ineffective assistance, and that the findings in those cases are attributable
to the Court's "[Waving been thoroughly persuaded of the importance of effective advo-
cacy at the penalty phase" of capital trials).
"5 See Berman, supra note 3, at 869.
236 Barkow, supra note 6, at 5 ("In 2004, more than one million adults received non-
capital sentences versus 115 people who received death sentences. The Court has focused
on the one percent of cases it views as the most sympathetic and created a special jurispru-
dence for them. With those cases off the table as a cause for concern, the Court can—and
has—ignored the rest.").
137 See 539 U.S. at 535.
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received less attention than capital sentencing—in particular, the Court
and comnaentators23s have not developed similar analysis regarding
what constitutes appropriate mitigating evidence—it may be more dif-
ficult to identify what mitigation evidence for non-capital defendants
would trigger counsel's duty to investigate.
And, perhaps more importantly, given the overwhelmingly large
number of non-capital convictions and sentencings that occur every
year, 239 courts may be simply unwilling to devote the same level of time
and resources that they allocate to capital cases. 24° As noted above, re-
source allocation concerns appear to have prompted some courts to
adopt heightened prejudice standards for ineffective assistance claims
in discretionary non-capital sentencing systems.
But if one puts aside the "death is different" analysis and the re-
source allocation concerns—indeed, the Supreme Court has not men-
tioned them241—it is hard to see why courts should not evaluate non-
capital sentencing performance in light of the recent decisions of Wil-
liams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. Following the analysis from those cases,
this subsection attempts to either identify or roughly articulate the fol-
lowing potential sources of extra-statutory sentencing law that ought to
inform evaluations of counsel's performance at sentencing proceeding:
ABA Standards, prevailing professional norms, and information regard-
ing what mitigation arguments tend to succeed in fully discretionary
systems. These sources are examined with the recognition that in order
to enforce a meaningful standard for performance at sentencing, we
must first seek to articulate and better develop the law and practice of
non-capital sentencing.
1. ABA Standards
The Supreme Court has become. increasingly receptive to the use
of ABA Standards for representation as "guidelines" to evaluate coun-
sel's . performance. 242
 Although the standards are more developed for
2Se The death penalty is the subject of a significant amount of academic commentary.
Berman, supra note 3, at 868 n.41.
259 Id. at 866-67.
240 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 4-5 ("By not having to consider criminal sentencing
questions under the same constitutional rules, the Court can scrutinize death cases more
closely without taking on the burden of policing all criminal cases. The Court has an inter-
est in doing this because it allows the Court to feel better about its role in capital punish-
ment's administration without paying much of a price.").
24'
	 Smith, supra note 169, at 371.
242 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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the representation of capital defendants, the ABA does provide some
specific advice regarding the representation of non-capital defendants.
Several courts have relied explictly on ABA Guidelines in assessing
counsel's performance in non-capital cases. 243 Specifically, the ABA ad-
vises counsel to be familiar with all of the sentencing law and proce-
dures, including available sentences in the jurisdiction, as well as the
ordinary sentences imposed for the defendant's offense. 2" Defense
counsel is directed to "present to the court any ground which will assist
in reaching a proper disposition faVorable to the accused."245 To
achieve this objective, counsel is expected to attend the defendant's
interview with the probation officer,246 to review the presentence report
or summary, if available, and to "seek to verify the information con-
tained in it and should be prepared to supplement or challenge it if
necessary."247 Counsel must also "submit to the court and the prosecu-
tor all favorable information relevant to sentencing and in an appro-
priate case, with the consent of the accused, be prepared to suggest a
program of rehabilitation based on defense counsel's exploration of
employment, educational, and other opportunities made available by
community services."248 Counsel is also directed to consult with her cli-
ent and to advise her of various rights and other information.249
243 See, e.g„ United States v. Russell, 221 F.3d 615, 620-21 (4th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014,
1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
244 The ABA explains:
Defense counsel should, at the earliest possible time, be or become familiar
with all of the sentencing alternatives available to the court and with commu-
nity and other facilities which may be of assistance in a plan for meeting the
accused's needs. Defense counsel's preparation should also include familiari-
zation with the court's practices in exercising sentencing discretion, the prac-
tical consequences of different sentences, and the normal pattern of sen-
tences for the offense involved, including any guidelines applicable at either
the sentencing or parole stages.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
4-8.1(a) .
245 Id. at 4-8.1(b).
246 Id. at 4-8.1(c).
247 Id. at 4-8.1(b).
248 1d.
249 "The consequences of the various dispositions available should be explained fully
by defense counsel to the accused." Id. at 4-8.1(a). "Defense counsel should also insure
that the accused understands the nature of the presentence investigation process, and in
particular the significance of statements made by the accused to probation officers and ,
related personnel." Id. at 4-8.1(c). "Defense counsel should alert the accused to the right
of allocution, if any, and to the possible dangers of making a statement that might tend to
prejudice an appeal." Id. at 4-8.1(d).
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These standards are far from detailed. Aside from the standard
that encourages counsel to prepare a program of rehabilitation, the
ABA' does not provide substantive guidance to defense counsel. Unlike
the ABA's death penalty standards, which recommend specific types of
witnesses and mitigating arguments, the non-capital standards are task-
based: they direct sentencing counsel to familiarize herself with the
sentencing law, procedures, and practice; they require familiarity with
the underlying facts of the offense and offender (through the presen-
tence report process); and they generally admonish counsel to present
"favorable information relevant to sentencing. "25°
The Supreme Court's recent reliance on ABA Standards notwith-
standing, heavy reliance on ABA Standards arguably runs afoul of Strick-
land's explicit statement that the ABA Standards should be treated only
as "guides to determining what is reasonable" 251 because a "particular
set of detailed rules" for counsel's performance would be inappropri-
ate. 252 The Strickland Court cautioned against detailed rules for coun-
sel's performance on the theory that such rules would "interfere with
the constitutionally protected independence of counsel."255 The Court
never explained this statement, except to cite to United States v. Decos-
0;254 a case decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1976. The
Decoster majority counseled against "a wide-ranging inquiry, even after
trial, into the conduct of defense counsel," reasoning that the prosecu-
tion would "ask to oversee defense counsel's conduct at trial—to ensure
against reversal" and that such oversight would transform our adversar-
ial system (which is designed to protect the rights of the accused) into
an inquisitorial system. 255 This reasoning from Decoster seems highly
suspect. That defense counsel's performance could result in reversal
hardly compels the conclusion that the prosecution be permitted to
"oversee" defense counsel. Trial courts, for instance, make countless
decisions that undoubtedly may result in the reversal of conviction. Yet
no one would think to argue that the prosecution be permitted to
"oversee" the trial court in its decisionmaking processes. And even if a
prosecutor did request such oversight of defense counsel, courts could
obviously reject such a request.
250 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 4-8.1 (d).
251
 466 U.S. at 688.
252 Id. at 688-89.
255 See id. at 689.
254 Id. (citing United States v Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
255 624 F.2d at 208.
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The Strickland Court also cautioned against particular detailed
rules for counsel's performance because such rules could possibly "dis-
tract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the
defendant's cause."256 Some commentators have criticized these reser-
vations about performance standards, noting that the "need to make
individualized strategic decisions ... does not preclude the develop-
ment of effective performance standards.'"257 That is because perform-
ance standards "would not mandate particular decisions; instead such
standards would identify the factors that competent lawyers must con-
sider in exercising professional judgment."258
2. Prevailing Professional Norms
In addition to written guidelines, the reasonableness of an attor-
ney's performance may also be gauged by reference to prevailing pro-
fessional norms. 259 Expert opinions may help courts assess what the
prevailing local norms of practice are (or were at the time of convic-
tion). State bar rules or professional responsibility codes could also in-
dicate prevailing professional norms in a community. The Court re-
ferred to prevailing local norms in Wiggins when Finding that counsel's
limited investigation constituted unreasonable performance. 260 A sur-
vey of the literature on sentencing indicates that there are a number of
prevailing norms with respect to counsel's performance at sentencing
that compliment and elaborate on the ABA Standards discussed in the
previous section. 261
Defense counsel has a clear duty at sentencing— "to advocate the
least restrictive and least burdensome [sentence] that is realistic, given
the facts and circumstances of the case."262 To fulfill this duty, counsel is
expected to undertake a series of tasks. First, counsel should be aware
258 466 U.S. at 689.
257 Genego, supra note 16, at 206.
258 Calhoun, supra note 16, at 437-40.
259 See Sevilla, supra note 16, at 940-41.
26° Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (noting that counsel's investigation "fell short of the pro-
fessional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989"). The Court appears to have based
this determination on an admission by trial counsel. Id.
281 See, e.g., Genego, supra note 16, at 207 ("There are, for example, some obligatory
actions which should be taken in all cases, while in other cases, the attorney would be ex-
pected to take specific actions unless he or she had sound strategic reasons for not doing
so.").
282 Id.; see SuBIN, BERKE & TIRSCHWELL, supra note 178, at 490 (stating that a "defense
lawyer's obligations in connection with sentencing" are to "do whatever is legally and ethi-
cally permissible to achieve for the client the most lenient sentence possible").
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of the potential sentence that the client is facing, including applicable
fines or restitution.263 Second, the attorney should be aware of the rele-
vant sentencing procedures, 2" including any discretion that the sen-
tencing judge or jury has in the particular case. 265 Third, counsel
should be familiar with the facts of the offense and the background of
the defendant. 266
 Fourth, counsel should investigate the aggravating
evidence introduced by the prosecution and, where feasible, challenge
that evidence.267 Fifth, counsel should investigate potential mitigating
evidence268 and, where appropriate, introduce that evidence at a sen-
tencing hearing. 269
The prevailing sentencing norms also make explicit certain duties
that are only implicit in the ABA Standards.") For example, rather than
simply directing counsel to review the presentence report or summary,
if available, and to "seek to verify the information contained in it and
262 See Michael A. Feit, "Before Sentence Is Pronounced . . . ", 9 Cane. L. BULL. 140, 141
(1973); Genego, supra note 16, at 207-08.
264 See SUBIN, BERKE & TIRSCHWELL; supra note 178, at 491; Genego, supra note 16, at
208.
265 See Feit, supra note 263, at 145; Genego, supra note 16, at 207; Calhoun, supra note
16, at 439.
266 See Correll v. Ryan, 965 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that, in capital
cases, sentencing counsel should undertake inquiries into "social background and evi-
dence of family abuse, potential mental impairment, physical health history, and history of
drug and alcohol abuse," including "examination of mental and physical health records,
school records, and criminal records"); Morris, 658 P.2d at 1280; Kuh, supra note 168, at
435 (' [P]resentence reports should be carefully examined by defense counsel").
267 See Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Taylor v.
State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 342 (Ind. 2006); cf. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385-86 (stating that coun-
sel had a duty to learn about aggravating evidence that the prosecution intended to intro-
duce in order "to discover any mitigating evidence the Commonwealth would downplay,
and to anticipate the details of the aggravating evidence the Commonwealth would em-
phasize").
265
 See Marlowe, supra note 16, at 31 (describing Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 799-96
(11th Cir. 1985), as illustrating "the principle that defense counsel must perform reasonable
investigations to discover possible mitigating evidence").
269 See Ro-rn, supra note 168, at 2; Feit, supra note 263, at 149, 157; Kuh, supra note 168,
at 436; Calhoun, supra note 16, at 439; see also jot A. CANNON ET AL., LAW AND TACTICS IN
SENTENCING 8-9 (1970) ("Prior to the actual imposition of sentence, counsel should at-
tempt to relate to the sentencing judge his recommendation for sentencing along with
supporting reasons."). But see CANNON ET AL., supra, at 9 ("There may not be a need to
communicate with the sentencing judge prior to sentence in every case. In those cases
where the sentence to be imposed is a foregone conclusion due to a mandatory provision
or otherwise, counsel may be well advised not to abuse this privilege so that he may exer-
cise it more effectively in those cases where the decision as to sentence is not so easily ar-
rived at.").
270 Cf. Calhoun, supra note 16, at 419 (asserting a "basic premise that certain identifi-
able actions by counsel are essential to effective representation").
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... supplement or challenge it if necessary: 771 the norms identify three
separate duties—(a) familiarity with the facts of the offense and the
background of the defendant, (b) investigation and adversarial testing
of aggravating evidence introduced by the prosecution, and (c) investi-
gation and presentation of potential mitigating evidence—each of
which is implicit in the ABA Standards direction regarding presentence
reports.
In addition to these specific tasks, it is also important that counsel
begin her work on sentencing issues as early as possible in the proceed-
ing, both because 'sentencing issues may affect questions of liability
(such as whether the defendant should consider a guilty plea), and also
because counsel who begins contemplating sentencing issues only after
conviction may not have sufficient time to prepare a comprehensive
mitigation case on behalf of her client. 272
3. Perceived Importance or Success Rate of Mitigating Evidence
Even in the absence of sentencing statutes or guidelines, it may still
be possible to identify what mitigating evidence is considered particu-
larly powerful in various jurisdictions. In the capital context, commen-
tators have noted that courts weigh different mitigating evidence dif-
ferently in ineffective assistance claims. 273 Similar patterns can be
discerned in non-capital sentencing. 274
 A defendant's prior convictions,
for example, are considered highly relevant to non-capital sentencing
decisions.275
 Thus, if defense counsel rendered deficient performance
with respect to a prior conviction—e.g., if counsel failed to correct un-
true information regarding the defendant's previous convictions that
resulted in a misperception by the sentencer that the criminal history
was more serious—then counsel's performance should be deemed un-
271 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 48.1 (b).
272 "From the moment counsel undertakes representation of a criminal defendant, he
should begin to prepare for the sentencing process." CANNON ET AL., supra note 269, at 1.
2" See Graham, supra note 46, at 1665-66.
274 Local defense bars or national organizations—such as the Federal Defenders or the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers—could collect information about sen-
tencing practices, such as the success rates of various mitigating arguments.
275 See George W. Pugh & M. Hampton Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to
Mempa to McGutha, 49 Thx. L. REV. 25, 28, n.27 (1970) ("[T] he defendant's criminal re-
cord has traditionally been considered an especially important factor in the fixing of sen-
tence."); see also,Hessick, supra note 196, at 1110-11 ("At sentencing, prior convictions ...
are treated as one of the most important pieces of sentencing information.").
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reasonable even in completely discretionary sentencing systems. 276 And
if counsel failed to correct other "materially untrue information" about
the defendant's past, that failure may also constitute ineffective assis-
tance even in fully discretionary systems. 277
Defendants in fully discretionary systems could also reference sub-
stantive sentencing law—such as statutes or sentencing guidelines—
from other jurisdictions as evidence that particular mitigating evidence
is ordinarily perceived as relevant to sentencing decisions. Some miti-
gating factors that have been considered particularly powerful in vari-
ous jurisdictions include whether the defendant played only a minor
role in the commission of a crime; 278
 whether the defendant is unlikely
to reoffend;279
 whether the defendant's actions caused only minor
276
 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that that the absence of counsel during sentenc-
ing after a plea of guilty coupled with materially untrue assumptions concerning the de-
fendant's criminal history constitute a deprivation of due process. See Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948); see also Taylor, 840 N.E.2d at 341-42 (appellate counsel ren-
dered deficient performance for failing, inter alia, to challenge trial court's decision to
place too much weight on defendant's criminal history, which was "not particularly grave
or related to" the instant offense); State v. Allen, 20 P.3d 747, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)
("When previous misdemeanor convictions are being used to enhance a defendant's sen-
tence [in a guidelines system], defendant's counsel should make some inquiry about the
validity of the convictions ....").
277 See United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Prior to passage of
the Sentencing Reform Act, appellate review of sentences was unavailable unless they ex-
ceeded statutory limits, mulled from material misinformation or were based upon constitu-
tionally impermissible considerations.") (emphasis added); Judge Irving R. Kaufman, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Introductory Remarks of the Symposium at the
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Appel-
late Review of Sentences (Sept. 24, 1962) ("A sentence will be vacated when a reviewing
tribunal finds that it is based upon information which is so clearly incorrect or upon crite-
ria so improper as to constitute a violation of the defendant's right to due process."); cf.
Pugh & Carver, supra note 275, at 28 (arguing that "due process is violated when a defen-
dant not represented by counsel is sentenced on the basis of materially untrue informa-
tion").
276 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (2008); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(d) (1), (2) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(E) (4) (Supp. 2008); CAL. R.
CT. 4.423(a) (1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0016(4) (b) (West 2006) (repealed 1998); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4716(c) (1) (B) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e) (2) (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-35-113(4) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(1)(1) (West 2003 & Supp.
2009); State v. Guerard, 682 N.W.2d 12, 25-26 (Wis. 2004). But see State s' Studler, 213
N.W.2d 24, 25-26 (Wis. 1973) (holding that the sentence was not excessive even though de-
fendant's accomplice, who pled guilty before another judge to the same crime, who ap-
peared to be more culpable than this defendant, and who had no better criminal record
than that of defendant, had received a lesser sentence).
278 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706.621(2) (e)—(h) (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-2521(2) (g)—(i) (2004); 730 Contr. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.1(a) (7)—(10) (West
2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(c) (6)—(8) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1(8)(28)—(30) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b) (7)—(10)
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harm, or were intended to cause only minor harm;280 whether the de-
fendant has made (or will make) restitution to the victim; 281 and
whether the defendant assisted or cooperated with authorities. 282 Sdme
jurisdictions will mitigate sentences based on age, 288 or when impris-
onment would constitute a "hardship" for the defendant or her fam-
ily. 284
 Many jurisdictions also consider imperfect defenses as strong
mitigating factors, 285 such as conduct by the victim that contributed to
the crime,286 imperfect claims of coercion and duress, 287 and dimin-
ished capacity.288
(West 2005 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(20); N.D. CENT. ConE
§ 12.1-32-04(7)-(10) (1997); 'TENN, Cone ANN, § 40-35-113(11).
293 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d) (12); CAL. R. CT. 4.423(a) (6); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 706-621(2) (a); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2521 (2) (a)-(b); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/5-5-3.1 (a)(1), (2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(c)(1)
(LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. A. § 21-4716(c)(1)(E); LA, CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 894.1 (B) (22), (23); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:44-1(b) (1)-(2) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e) (9); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-04(1), (2);
01110 REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12 (C) (3) (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(1).
281 See CAL. R. CT. 4.423(b) (5); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0016(4)(h); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-2521 (2) (f); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.1 (a) (6); INn. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-
7.1 (c) (9) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1(B) (27);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(6) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.16(e) (5); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(6); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(5); WAsit.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(1) (b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
282 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1, p.s.; ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(d) (11); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0016(4)(i) (West 2006) (repealed 1998); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b) (12) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); . N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.16(e) (7); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1.32-04(14); TNN.I ConEANN. § 40-35-113(9), (10).
283 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0016(4)(k) (West 2006) (repealed 1998); N,C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1340.16(e) (4); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(12); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(6).
284 SEE HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 700621(2)(1); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-
3.1 (a) (I 1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); INn. CODE MN. § 35.38-1-7.1(c) (10) (LexisNexis
1998 & Supp. 2007); LA. CODE Clint, PROC. ANN. art. 894,1(B)(31); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-1 (b) (11) (West 2005 Sc Supp. 2009); N.D. CENT. Cone § 12.1-32-04(11); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e) (17) (2007) (identifying as mitigating whether the de-
fendant supports her family).
285 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706.621(2) (c) (LexisNexis 2007); InAtto CoDE
ANN. § 19-2521(2)(d) (2004); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. g 5/5-5-3.1(a) (4): IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1 (b) (4) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 894.1(B) (25) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1 (b) (4) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(4) (1997); Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(C)(4); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-35-113(3) (2006).
286 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10, p.s.; ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(d)(6), (7) (2008); CAL. R. CT. 4.423(a) (2); FLA. STAT. ANN. g 921.0016(4)(0
(West 2006) (repealed 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-621(2) (b), (d); InAtto CODE ANN.
§ 19-2521(2)(c), (e); 730 ILL, COMP. STAT. MN. § 5/5-5-3.1(a)(3); IND. CODE ANN. § 35.381-
7.1(b) (3), (5) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c) (1) (A) (2007);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1(B) (24), (26); N.J. STAT. ANN. § (b) (3), (5)
(West 2005 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340,16(e) (8); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-
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CONCLUSION
Discretionary sentencing enjoys a long history in the United
States. Yet the legal standards and principles for assessing the effective-
ness of counsel's performance at discretionary non-capital proceedings
are underdeveloped. Courts have repeatedly intimated that standards
should be different, referencing gatekeeping concerns and noting that
discretionary sentencing is not necessarily a formal, adversarial pro-
ceeding. As this Article demonstrates, courts have overstated the need
for heightened ineffective assistance standards for gatekeeping pur-
poses, and modern sentencing has become an increasingly formal
process where defense counsel serves an important advocacy role—i.e.,
advocating the least harsh sentence for her client
To understand the true challenge that ineffective assistance at sen-
tencing claims present, it is first necessary to acknowledge how impor-
tant substantive law is to the evaluation of counsel's performance. As
explained above, the most successful ineffective assistance claims—legal
error claims and failure to investigate claims—require an assessment of
counsel's performance against the backdrop of the relevant substantive
law. The prevalence of substantive sentencing law differs in different
types of systems: mandatory sentencing systems use substantive law to
limit or channel the sentencing decisions of judges; fully discretionary
04(3), (5); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2929.12(C)(1), (2) (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
35-113(2); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(1) (a) (West 2003 Sc Supp. 2009).
287 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5K2.12, p.s.; ALASKA STAT.
§ 12,55.155(d) (3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1S-701(E)(3); CAL. R. CT. 4.423(a) (4); FLA. STAT.
§ 921.0016(4)(g) (West 2006) (repealed 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e) (1);
TEN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(12); WASII. Rev. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(1)(c) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2009).
2A8
 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, p.s.; ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(d) (18); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(E) (2) (Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.0016(4)(c) (West 2006) (repealed 1998); KAN. S FAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c) (1) (C); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e) (3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(8); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.535(1) (e) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); see also United States v. Jackson, 747 F.3d 786,
795 (7th Cir. 2008) ("PA iminished mental capacity is a 'ground of recognized legal merit'
in seeking a lower sentence." (quoting United States v. Cunningham. 429 F.3d 673, 679
(7th Cir. 2005))); Timothy Cone, Developing the Eighth Amendment for Those "Least Deserving"
of Punishment: Statutory Mandatory Minimums for Noncapital Offenses Can Be "Cruel and Un-
usual" When Imposed on Mentally Retarded Offenders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 35, 44-45 & nn.78-83
(2004) (collecting sources). But see Vega v. Comm'r of Corr., 930 A.2d 75, 77-78 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2007) (holding that trial counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence of psy-
chiatric report of defendant did not constitute deficient performance that prejudiced
defendant, as required to support claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because psy-
chiatric report could have reinforced discretionary determination that maximum sentence
was necessary to protect public).
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sentencing systems leave the identification and relative weight of sen-
tencing factors to the sentencer; and in between these two extremes are
systems that guide the discretion of sentencers by identifying some fac-
tors that the sentencing judge either may or must consider.
But a jurisdiction's substantive sentencing law is not the only back-
drop against which counsel's performance may be measured. In three
recent capital ineffective assistance cases, the Supreme Court looked
beyond the governing sentencing statutes to additional sources— in-
cluding ABA Standards, prevailing professional norms, and the Court's
OWIl decisions—that identify important mitigating evidence. Such
sources exist and should be further developed for non-capital sentenc-
ing. This development would provide not only doctrinal clarity for inef-
fective assistance at sentencing claims, but also may serve to improve
the quality of representation at sentencing. These other sources of
mitigating evidence would assist counsel in fully discretionary systems
by helping to identify successful mitigation arguments and evidence
from the apparently infinite number of potential arguments available.
